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DEFINING "PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE" AFTER CENTRAL
PATHOLOGY SERVICE MEDICAL CLINIC V. SUPERIOR COURT:
SHOULD CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAL INJURY COMPENSATION
REFORM ACT COVER INTENTIONAL TORTS?
PAUL F. ARENTZ*
INTRODUCTION
In 1975 the California State Legislature enacted the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) in response to what was commonly
referred to at the time as the "medical malpractice crisis." 2 MICRA's
provisions changed considerably the law governing actions for medical
malpractice.3 MICRA shortened the applicable statute of limitations during
* B.A., University of Arizona, 1990; J.D., cum laude, California Western School of Law,
1993. The author is an associate with Bonne, Bridges, Mueller, O'Keefe & Nichols, in Los
Angeles, California.
1. Stats. 1975, Second Ex. Sess. 1975-1976, chs. 1, 2, pp. 3949-40007.
2. The legislature convened in an extraordinary session to consider measures aimed at
remedying the rapid increase in medical malpractice premiums. As then Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Jr. stated in his address to the legislature:
The cost of medical malpractice insurance has risen to levels which many physicians
and surgeons find intolerable. The inability of doctors to obtain such insurance at
reasonable rates is endangering the health of the people of this State, and threatens
the closing of many hospitals. The longer term consequences of such closings could
seriously limit the health care provided to hundreds of thousands of our citizens.
Governor's Proclamation to Leg. (May 16, 1975) Stats. 1975 (Second Ex. Sess. 1975-1976) p.
3947.
The "medical malpractice crisis" was characterized by a 40% increase in claims filed
against physicians from 1965 to 1975. Between 1968 and 1970, the malpractice group insurance
rates for physicians rose 400%. PRELIMINARY REPORT, CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT
COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 3 (1974). The reason for the increase in malpractice
claims was felt to be attributable to the depersonalization of the doctor-patient relationship, the
increasing expectations of patients regarding the infallibility of modem medicine, and doctrinal
charges in the law applicable to medical malpractice claims. Id. at 4. There is some evidence
the "crisis" began as early as 1961. See Benjamin J. Naitove, Medicolegal Education and the
Crisis in Interprofessional Relations, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 293, 295 (1982).
3. Despite the significant changes MICRA wrought on medical malpractice claims, its
provisions were uniformly upheld against a series of constitutional challenges based on the Equal
Protection Clause. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670 (Cal.
1984)(periodic payment of future damages); Barme v. Wood, 689 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1984)
(abrogation of collateral source rule); Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 695 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985)
(limitation on contingency fees); Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985)
(cap on noneconomic damages). For a contemporary overview of MICRA see Selected 1975
California Legislation: Torts; Medical Malpractice, 7 PAC. L. J. 544 (1975) [hereinafter Selected
1975 California Legislation].
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which a medical malpractice claim could be brought,4 abolished the
collateral source rule,5 allowed periodic payment of future damages, 6
regulated contingency fee arrangements,7 authorized arbitration clauses in
medical services contracts,8 and perhaps most significantly, placed a
$250,000 cap on noneconomic losses.9
One unresolved issue concerning MICRA has been its application to
actions other than those for "professional negligence."1" Initially, MICRA
appeared to apply only to specified health care providers" and only to
actions for "professional negligence."'" However, in Central Pathology
Service Medical Clinic v. Superior Court,3 the California Supreme Court,
interpreting an analogous provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that
an injured party seeking punitive damages from a health care provider for an
4. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340.5. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Under the
collateral source rule, evidence of insurance or other benefits paid to the injured party are
inadmissible for the purpose of diminishing the amount of recovery. Helfend v. Southern
California Rapid Transit Dist., 465 P.2d 61 (Cal. 1970).
6. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC § 667.7. See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
7. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
8. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC § 1295. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
10. MICRA contains six sections defining "professional negligence" as "a negligent act or
omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or
omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such
services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not
within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital." CAL. CODE Civ.
PROC. §§ 364(f)(2), 667(e)(4), 1295(g)(2); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)(3); CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 3333.1(c)(2), 3333.2(c)(2).
The term "professional negligence" has been broadly construed. Most of the cases
interpreting the phrase "professional negligence" have been concerned with distinguishing
professional from ordinary negligence. Atienza v. Taub, 239 Cal. Rptr. 454 (Ct. App. 2d Dist.
1987) (inducing a patient to enter sexual relationship on pretext it is necessary part of treatment
constitutes "professional negligence"); Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital, 260 Cal. Rptr. 886 (Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 1989) ("professional negligence" includes a hospital's failure to fulfill its duty
to screen the competency of its medical staff); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 669 P.2d 41 (Cal.
1983) (failure to warn constitutes "professional negligence"); Murillo v. Good Samaritan
Hospital, 160 Cal. Rptr. 33 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1979) and Taylor v. United States, 821 F.2d
1428 (9th Cir. 1987) (MICRA applies to "garden variety" negligence in an action against a
health care provider irrespective of the level of skill required in the situation resulting in injury).
But see Andrea N. v. Laurelwood Convalescent Hospital, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 894, 904 (Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1993) (failure to provide security not "professional negligence"); Flores v. Natividad
Medical Center, 238 Cal. Rptr. 24 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1987) (failure to summon medical help
for prisoner not "professional negligence"); Nelson v. Gaunt, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173-174 (Ct.
A pp. 1st Dist. 1981) (statute of limitations for professional negligence does not apply to cause
of action against physician for fraud).
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 defines a "health care provider" as "any person
licensed or certified pursuant to Division 2 (commencing with § 500) of the Business and
Professions Code, or licensed pursuant to the Osteopathic Initiative Act, or the Chiropractic
Initiative Act, or licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with § 1440) of Division 2 of
the Health and Safety Code." "Health care provider" includes the legal representatives of a
health care provider. Id.
12. See generally Selected 1975 California Legislation, supra note 3, at 544.
13. 832 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1992).
[Vol. 30
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injury "directly related" to the performance of professional services must
comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13, which bars a claim for
punitive damages unless the court has determined at the pleading stage there
is a "substantial probability" the plaintiff will prevail on the claim."4 More
important, the Court held, identifying a cause of action as an intentional tort
rather than negligence does not remove such a claim from the requirements
of the statute.'5  This decision reversed the Fifth District Court of Appeal
decision in Bommareddy v. Superior Court,6 which had held section
425.13(a) inapplicable to a cause of action for battery.17
Although section 425.13 is not a part of the statutory scheme created by
MICRA,'8 Central Pathology does raise questions about which claims in an
action for medical malpractice should be covered by MICRA. Specifically,
the decision raises the issue of whether MICRA provisions such as the cap
on noneconomic damages, or the limitation on contingency fees should be
applied to actions for battery, fraud, or intentional infliction of emotional
distress; actions which comprise a small but significant portion of malpractice
suits. 19
This article addresses the issue of MICRA's applicability to causes of
action for intentional torts. Part I provides an overview of MICRA and
explains the Act's effect on medical malpractice actions. Part II discusses the
Central Pathology decision and explains the Court's approach to statutory
interpretation and how this interpretation should apply to MIRCA as well.
Part III examines prior interpretations of MICRA with respect to coverage
of intentional torts. Finally, part IV proposes that the MICRA provisions
should apply to all torts, regardless of intent, which occur during the course
of performing professional services. However, MIRCA should exclude those
acts which are committed with a purely personal or non-therapeutic purpose.
14. 832 P.2d at 931. In order to show a "substantial probability" of prevailing on a claim
for punitive damages, a plaintiff who seeks to amend his complaint to assert punitive damages
must demonstrate the existence of a prima facie case entitling the plaintiff to punitive damages.
College Hospital v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 833, 836 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1993);
accord, Looney v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182, 191 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1993).
Because the plaintiff must prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing
evidence at trial, the court in ruling on such a motion must evaluate the evidence presented in
light of that standard. Looney, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
15. 832 P.2d at 931.
16. 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990), rev'd, Central Pathology Serv. Medical Clinic Inc. v.
Superior Court, 832 P.2d at 927.
17. Bommareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
18. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
19. Actions for medical malpractice may be based on claims for battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, breach of contract, fraud and negligence.
1994]
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF MICRA
The primary purpose behind MICRA is to ensure the availability of
health care by making medical malpractice insurance coverage affordable.'
At the time MICRA was enacted, malpractice rates were spiraling out of
control and in response many physicians went on strike, threatened to stop
providing care in high-risk specialties, or simply left practice all together.2
Still others began to practice "bare."' Accordingly, MICRA was enacted
to lessen the costs on health care insurers of paying out malpractice judgments.'
20. The spirit in which MICRA was enacted is evident from the preamble to MICRZA which
provides inter alia:
The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the State
of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting in
a potential breakdown of the health delivery system, severe hardships for the
medically indigent, a denial of access for the economically marginal, and depletion
of physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of health care available to
citizens of this state. The Legislature, acting within the scope of its police power,
finds the statutory remedy herein provided is intended to provide an adequate and
reasonable remedy within the limits of what the foregoing public health safety
considerations permit now and into the foreseeable future.
1975 Cal. Stat. c. 1, § 1, at 4007. See also Samuel Shore, Civil Liability Expands in State But
Insurance Costs Keep Up Pace, L.A. DAILY J., September 11, 1978, at 9 (indicating problems
of health care availability and insurance coverage cost and availability).
21. When Doctors Went Out On Strike, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 26, 1975, at 4
(strike by San Francisco Anesthesiologists angered at rising malpractice insurance costs); see
also, When Doctors Rebel Against Higher Insurance Costs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
19, 1976, at 36 (work slowdown by Los Angeles County doctors angered at proposed insurance
rate increase of 486 percent).
22. Practicing "bare" means to practice without malpractice insurance coverage. Barme v.
Wood, 689 P.2d 446, 448-449 (Cal. 1984).
However, the so-called liability crisis has all but vanished and insurance premiums have
remained stable for several years. Also, the flight of doctors from high-risk specialties such as
obstetrics due to increases in insurance premiums seems to have come to an end as well.
Kenneth Jost, Still Warring Over Medical Malpractice: Time for Something Better, A.B.A. J.,
May, 1993, at 68.
23. In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, 683 P.2d 670, 672 (Cal. 1984)
the Supreme Court stated MICRA (1) attempted to reduce the incidence and severity of medical
malpractice injuries by strengthening governmental oversight of physician education, "(2) sought
to curtail unwarranted insurance premium increases by authorizing alternative insurance coverage
programs and by establishing new procedures to review substantial rate increases, and (3)
attempted to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of medical malpractice litigation by
revising a number of legal rules applicable to such litigation .... The goal of the Legislature
was to reduce the number of medical malpractice actions filed, with the hope of a corresponding
reduction in malpractice insurance rates." Noble v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 38, 40 (Ct.
App. 2d Dist. 1987).
But see Anthony Aarons, Insurance Bad Faith, Business Litigation Dominate in Top 10
Verdicts, L.A. DAILY J., March 22, 1993, at 1. "In light of all the attention given medical
malpractice in tort and health care reform debates, it is interesting that none of the 10 largest
verdicts in 1992 came in medical malpractice cases." Furthermore, new studies by legal,
medical and public health experts show that juries rarely make awards to malpractice plaintiffs
and that unjustified awards are even rarer. Jost, supra note 22, at 68. Also, in terms of
ensuring the affordability of health care, the malpractice system accounts for only one percent
of the nation's health care bill, in direct costs, and no more than five percent in total costs,
including so-called "defensive medicine." Id.
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A. Cap on Recovery of Noneconomic Damages
Perhaps the most controversial limitation imposed by MICRA is the
limitation imposed on noneconomic damages.24 This section is at the
forefront of MICRA's effort to reduce insurance costs. 5  Under MICRA
an injured plaintiff is limited to $250,000 in noneconomic losses.' The cap
does not apply to economic damages27 which include medical expenses, loss
of earnings, and loss of employment resulting from the injury..
B. Periodic Payment of Future Damages
At the request of either the plaintiff or the defendant, the court in a
malpractice case must enter judgment ordering that future damages be paid
24. MICRA has been disfavored by attorneys who represent plaintiffs in malpractice cases
and its enactment was a major political defeat for the California Trial Lawyers Association.
During the last days of the 1987 legislative session, lobbyists met with Assembly Speaker Willie
Brown in Frank Fat's restaurant near the Capitol and signed an agreement on a napkin providing
for a five year truce during which the trial lawyers would refrain from attempting to overturn
MICRA. With that agreement expiring in 1992, the MICRA issue is expected to soon become
an issue again; especially the cap on noneconomic damages. Dan Walters, Looming War Over
MICRA: Doctor Malpractice is Back on Agenda in Sacramento, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 26, 1993,
at 6.
Plaintiffs' lawyers and consumer groups say their biggest gripe is with the medical
malpractice law's $250,000 ceiling on 'noneconomic damages.'. .. They argue that
the limitation-which has not changed despite 17 years of inflation-hurts the elderly,
the poor and others who cannot show much 'economic' damage from the loss of jobs
or future earnings.
The limits make it tough for such people to get representation, since the costs of the
case can exceed the amount of damages....
Reynolds Holding, Truce Expires Between Lawyers, Doctors: Malpractice Battle to Erupt Anew,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8, 1993, at Al.
25. "Section 3333.2... is, of course, one of the provisions which made changes in existing
tort rules in an attempt to reduce the cost of medical malpractice litigation, and thereby restrain
the increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums. It appears obvious that this section-by
placing a ceiling of $250,000 on the recovery of noneconomic damages-is rationally related to
the objective of reducing the costs of malpractice defendants and their insurers."
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 672 (Cal. 1985).
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 provides:
(a) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on professional
negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement
and other nonpecuniary damage.
(b) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two hundred
fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
Id. (emphasis added).
27. Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
28. BAi 14.00
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in whole or in part by periodic payments rather than by lump sum,29 if the
award equals or exceeds $50,000 in future damages." Money damages
awarded for the compensation of lost future wages may not be reduced or
terminated by the death of the injured plaintiff." The future earnings award
must be paid to dependents of the plaintiff.3
C. Abrogation of the Collateral Source Rule
Traditionally, the collateral source rule bars a defendant from introduc-
ing evidence of other sources of compensation for a plaintiff's injury. 3
However, under MICRA a defendant may elect to introduce evidence of
benefits payable to the plaintiff as a result of the injury and this amount is
reduced from the total amount awarded to the plaintiff.' The payor of the
29. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 667.7. The authorization of periodic payments is conditioned
on the judgment debtor's ability to post adequate security. Id. Failure to make periodic
payments renders the judgment debtor in contempt of court and liable for damages resulting from
nonpayment. Id. In American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital, the Supreme Court
explained:
The adoption of a periodic payment procedure permits insurers to retain fewer liquid
reserves and to increase investments, thereby reducing the costs to insurers and, in
turn, to insureds. In addition, the portion of section 667.7 which provides for the
termination of a significant portion of the remaining future damage payments in the
event of the plaintiff's death is obviously related to the goal of reducing insurance
costs.
683 P.2d 670, 678-79 (Cal. 1984).
"Apparently, this provision of the MICRA was included because payments of large sums
of money could place some insurance carriers in a precarious financial position which could only
be alleviated by drastic increase in the premium rate. Evidently, periodic payments may not
only obviate the 'windfall' effect that a lump sum judgment may have under certain circumstanc-
es, but may also tend to permit a more manageable and predictable insurance environment."
Selected 1975 California Legislation, supra note 3, at 549.
30. "Future damages" are damages for future medical treatment, care or custody or the
injured party, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain and suffering. Id.
§ 667.7(e)(1).
31. Id. § 667.7(c).
32. Id.
33. As the California Supreme Court explained in Helfend v. Southern California Rapid
Transportation District, 465 P.2d 61, 63 (Cal. 1970), California courts have long adhered to the
collateral source rule which provides that "if an injured party receives some compensation for
his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be
deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor."
The collateral source rule remains generally accepted in the United States despite the fact that
many other jurisdictions have restricted or repealed it. Id.
34. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 provides inter alia that:
(a) In the event the defendant so elects, in an action for personal injury based upon
professional negligence, he may introduce evidence of any amount payable as a
benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the personal injury pursuant to the United States
Social Security Act,[] any state or federal income disability or worker's compensation
act, any health, sickness or income-disability insurance, accident insurance that
provides health benefits or income-disability coverage, and any contract or agreement
of any group, organization, partnership, or corporation to provide, pay for, or
reimburse the cost of medical, hospital, dental, or other health care services. Where
[Vol. 30
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collateral benefits may not seek indemnity from either the plaintiff or
defendant, nor is the payor subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against the
defendant.3 5
D. Limitation on Contingency Fee Agreements
Another controversial MICRA provision is the limitation placed on
contingency fees in medical malpractice cases." MICRA prescribes a
"sliding scale" contingency fee system providing for a percentage fee
inversely related to the amount of the recovery." This limitation changes
the defendant elects to introduce such evidence, the plaintiff may introduce evidence
of any amount which the plaintiff has paid or contributed to secure his right to any
insurance benefits concerning which the defendant has introduced evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
In Barme v. Wood, the Supreme Court ruled that Civil Code section 3333.1(b) "is
rationally related to the objective of reducing the cost of medical malpractice insurance. By
prohibiting 'collateral sources' from obtaining reimbursement from medical malpractice
defendants or their insurers, the section obviously reduces the potential liability of such
defendants." 689 P.2d 446, 450 (Cal. 1984).
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1(b).
36. The purpose behind the enactment of this section was to discourage excessive fees and
allow a plaintiff to retain a greater percentage of the overall award. According to the Supreme
Court in Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, this is true because "a plaintiff will be more likely to
agree to a lower settlement since he will obtain the same net recovery" and such a rule will
"have the effect of deterring attorneys from either instituting frivolous suits or encouraging their
clients to hold out for unrealistically high settlements." 695 P.2d 164, 170-71 (Cal. 1985). The
court agreed with the Legislature's conclusion that "unregulated contingency fee contracts...
play at least some part in leading so many plaintiffs to pursue malpractice claims." Id. at 171.
Apparently the Legislature concluded that large fees from large judgments have detrimental
social effects. Selected 1975 California Legislation, supra note 3, at 549. There is some
uncertainty as to the effect contingency fees have upon the amount or cost of medical
malpractice claims. Id. (citing REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE, DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, Washington, D.C., DHEW
Publication No. (OS) 73-88, Jan. 16, 1973, app., The Medical Malpractice Legal System, at 113-
120).
37. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 provides inter alia that:
(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for representing any
person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury or damage against a
health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence in
excess of the following limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
recovered.
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000)
recovered.
(4) Fifteen percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds six hundred
thousand dollars ($600,000).
The limitations shall apply regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration,
or judgment, or whether the person for whom the recovery is made is a responsible adult,
can infant, or a person of unsound mind.
A "recovery" is the net amount of the judgment after deduction of legal expenses incurred
in settlement or prosecution of the claim. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE PROC. § (c)(1). In a
7
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dramatically the fee a plaintiff's attorney can collect in a medical malpractice
case as compared to other types of personal injury cases.38
E. Special Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice Actions
In order to expedite medical malpractice claims the Code of Civil
Procedure was amended to shorten the statute of limitations.39  An action
for malpractice brought by an adult must be commenced within three years
of the date of the injury or one year after the date the injury was or should
have been discovered, whichever occurs first. 4° The statute is tolled only
upon proof of fraud, intentional concealment, or by the presence of a non-
therapeutic foreign body in the plaintiff.41
The statute changed significantly the limitations period applicable to
minors. 42  An action on behalf of a minor must be brought within three
malpractice case such costs may be substantial. Medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff and
the attorney's office overhead costs or charges are not deductible. Id.
38. The disparity is best illustrated by example. Attorney represents two plaintiffs on a
contingency fee basis. A was injured in an automobile accident and after trial is awarded ajudgment of $2,000,000. B was the victim of medical malpractice and is awarded an equal
amount (after deducting payment from collateral sources and limiting noneconomic losses to
$250,000). Attorney's standard fee for personal injury cases which proceed to trial is 30% of
the total recovery. A's recovery will yield a fee of $600,000, but B's case will pay Attorney
only $371,665.
39. Former § 340.5 provided for a four-year statute of limitations, which was tolled only
upon proof the defendant failed to disclose any act, error, or omission of which he or she knew
or should have known. Former § 340.5 applied to actions based on lack of informed consent.
See e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972). Curiously, this provision is absent from the
present section 340.5. Arguably, § 340.5 should cover intentional torts. C. Selected 1975
California Legislation, supra note 3, at 547.
40. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340.5. This section applies to "an action for injury or death
based upon ... professional negligence." Id.
Rose v. Fife, 255 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989) explains the interrelationship
between the one and three-year periods: "The three year period begins to run when the plaintiff
discovers the harmful effect, i.e., the physical manifestation of the wrongful act. The negligent
cause of that effect is not a concern for the three-year period." Id. at 444-445. "The one-year
period commences when the plaintiff is aware of both the physical manifestation of the injury
and its negligent cause." Id. (emphasis in original). The plaintiff need not be aware of "facts
which establish the wrongdoing of a particular defendant or defendants before the one-year
period begins to run." Id. at 447.
41. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340.5. The "foreign body" exception tolls the three-year
outside limitation period and not the one-year "discovery" period. Ashworth v. Memorial
Hospital, 254 Cal. Rptr. 104, 110-11 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988). However, once the plaintiff
discovers or reasonably should have discovered the "foreign body" and its role in her injury she
has one year within which to file. Id. at 111.
42. Generally the statute of limitations for a minor in other tort actions is tolled for the
entire period of the plaintiffs minority. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 352.
The change in the statute applicable to minors is significant since many malpractice actions
involve injuries occurring at or near the time of birth. These "bad baby" complaints often allege
that the infant has suffered a brain injury resulting in cerebral palsy, epilepsy, or mental
retardation. Such injuries often result in permanent mental and physical disability and typically
involve high damage awards due to the protracted medical care required by the child after the
injury. See generally William P. Franklin, Jr. & Wendy Woods Williamson, "Bad Baby"
Lawsuits: Defending Brain-Damaged-Infant Claims, THE BRIEF, Winter 1993, at 55.
Pl'ol. 30
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years of the injury unless the child is under six years of age, in which case
the action must be commenced within three years or by the time the child
reaches eight years of age; whichever is the longer period of time.43 The
statute may be tolled in the case of fraud or collusion by the child's parent
and the defendant or the defendant's insurer, or by any of the tolling
provisions applicable to adults. 4 However, the delayed discovery rule does
not apply to minors.45
Additionally, a plaintiff is required to give the named potential
defendants a 90-day notice that he or she intends to file an action for
malpractice.' The notice must state the legal basis of the claim and
describe the alleged injury. If the notice of intent is served within 90 days
of the end of the applicable limitations period, the 90-day period is "tacked
on" to the one-year limitations period.47
F. Authorization of Agreement to Submit Claims to Arbitration
In an attempt to encourage arbitration of malpractice claims,' the
Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure section 1295 to allow arbitration
clauses in medical services contracts so long as its prescriptions are complied
with.49  Such a contract will also regulate fee disputes.50  The statute
43. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340.5.
44. Id.; Young v. Haines, 718 P.2d 909, 911 (Cal. 1986).
45. Id.
46. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 364. The purpose of requiring advance notice of the
plaintiffs intent to sue is to afford an opportunity for early resolution of the claim without resort
to judicial intervention. The penalty for not providing notice of intent to file suit is a possible
report to the State Bar. However, failure to give notice does not hurt the plaintiff unless the
statute of limitations expires.
47. Hilburger v. Madsen, 222 Cal. Rptr. 713, 718 (Ct App. 2d Dist. 1986); Braham v.
Sorenson, 174 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1981). Note that the outside three-year
period cannot be tolled for any reason other than those specified in § 340.5.
This extension of the limitations period was likely the result of a compromise between the
medical community and their counsel, and the plaintiff s bar. Noble v. Superior Court, 237 Cal.
Rptr. 38, 40 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1987).
48. See Selected 1975 California Legislation, supra note 3, at 544-55, 550-51. "[A]rbitr-
ation has become a proper and usual means of resolving civil disputes, including disputes
relating to medical malpractice." Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 552 P.2d 1178, 1188
(Cal. 1976). Furthermore, it is the "public policy of this state to favor arbitration over litigation
as a means of settling disputes because it is expeditious, avoids the delays of litigations, and
relieves court congestion." Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 782 (Ct. App.
4th Dist. 1976).
49. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1295 provides inter alia that:
(a) Any contract for medical services which contains a provision for arbitration of
any dispute as to professional negligence of a health care provider shall have such
provision as the first article of the contract and shall be expressed in the following
language: "It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice, that is as to
whether any medical services rendered under this contract were unnecessary or
unauthorized or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will be
determined by submission to arbitration as provided by California law, and not by a
lawsuit or resort to court process except as California law provides for judicial review
1994] 229
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specifically provides if all the provisions are complied with, such a contract
is not a contract of adhesion nor unconscionable."
II. CENTRAL PATHOLOGY SIGNALS A NEW
APPROACH TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Prior to the Central Pathology decision, there seemed to be little doubt
that the MICRA provisions applied only to actions for professional negli-
gence. 2 Two courts of appeal held that Code of Civil Procedure section
1295 applied to intentional torts.5 However, the California Supreme Court
and one court of appeal had declined to extend other MICRA provisions to
cover intentional torts. 4 Most notably, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
of arbitration proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are
giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute decided in a court of law
before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of arbitration."(b) Immediately before the signature line provided for the individual contracting for the
medical services must appear the following in at least 10-point bold red type.
"NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY
ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION
AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOU RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE
ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT."
50. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1295(c).
51. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1295(e). See also, Stanley D. Henderson, Contractual
Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REv.
947 (1972).
52. See note 10 supra defining "professional negligence" as a "negligent act or omission
... in the rendering of professional services."
Apparently, because of the scope of this definition an action brought under a legal
theory other than negligence will not be regulated by this part of the MICRA-for
instance, an action for battery on the grounds of a lack of "informed consent."
Furthermore, if the injury occurs while the health care provider is acting outside of
the scope of a license or hospital regulation, legal redress of such an injury may
apparently be pursued without regard to the restrictions of this part of MICRA.
Consequently, it would seem that in such a case general tort law should be followed.
Selected 1975 California Legislation, supra note 3, at 544 (emphasis in original). However, this
author mistakenly concluded that an action for lack of informed consent is a battery. An action
for lack of informed consent would undoubtedly be covered by MICRA since such a claim is
properly plead as negligence and not battery. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972). See
a discussion of Cobbs at infra notes 267-269 and accompanying text.
53. Herrera v. Superior Court, 204 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984) (holding that
plaintiff's entire claim alleging different theories arising from the same basic facts subject to
arbitration pursuant to statute providing for such arbitration although complaint alleged
intentional torts as well as negligent acts); accord, Baker v. Sadick, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Ct.
App. 4th Dist. 1984).
54. Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1985) (refusing to apply section regulating
contingency fees to an actio n ain a ttorney alleging that he charged an excessive fee in a
"hybrid" action alleging professional negligence and intentional tortious conduct against a
psychiatrist); Noble v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1987) (statute of
limitations tolling provisions applicable only to negligence causes of action and not to thosebased upon inte tional torts or other th ories as to which the limitati ns period has run).
230 [Vol. 30
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in Bommareddy,55 had held section 425.13(a) inapplicable to an action for
battery, 6 and the Fourth District in Szkorla v. Vecchione,' an opinion
later ordered depublished by the Supreme Court,58 held the cap on non-
economic damages did not apply to an action for battery. 9 By reversing
Bommareddy and depublishing Szkorla, the Supreme Court has reopened the
debate over MICRA's coverage of intentional torts.6'
A. Bommareddy v. Superior Court
In concluding section 425.13(a) was inapplicable to an action for
battery,61 the Bommareddy court's analysis centered on the exclusivity of
the term "professional negligence." The court concluded: "'Professional
negligence' as used in Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13 is a term of
art that does not include intentional torts, such as battery, even when
occurring during the provision of medical services.'62
In so ruling, the court rejected Dr. Bommareddy's argument that the
words "arising out of" were included by the Legislature in order to give that
section a broad application which would include a cause of action for battery
55. 272 Cal. Rptr. 246, 250 (Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1990), rev'd, Central Pathology, 832 P.2d
at 927.
56. Bommareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
57. 283 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1991), review granted, 286 Cal. Rptr. 779, 818 P.2d 62 (Cal.
1991), reprinted for tracking pending review, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1208 (4th Dist. 1991). Review
was later denied on the grounds that it was improvidently granted. Review was granted in
Szkorla at about the same time as Central Pathology. Mike McKee, MedMal Limits Face
Challenge in Supreme Court; Attack is on Damage Limits for Intentional Torts, THE RECORDER,
May 13, 1992, at 1. See a discussion of the analysis in Szkorla at infra notes 182-203 and
accompanying text.
58. CAL. RULE OF COURT § 979(e) provides a depublication order "shall not be deemed an
expression of opinion of the Supreme Court of the correctness of the result reached by the
decision or of any of the law set forth in the opinion." However, the Court arguably intended
to impliedly reverse Szkorla. "mo insist that those depublication orders are withoutsignificance would be to perpetuate a myth." People v. Dee, 272 Cal. Rptr. 208, 211 (Ct. App.
1st Dist. 1990). Opinions are depublished "because a majority of the justices .. consider the
opinion to be wrong in some significant way." Joseph R. Grodin, The Depublication Practice
of the California Supreme Court, 72 CAL. L. REV. 514, 514-15 (1984).
59. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
60. Alexander Peters, Supreme Court Reinstates MedMal Limits, THE RECORDER, Aug. 3,
1992, at 1. According to Kent Richland who represented the Central Pathology clinic before
the Supreme Court, under the Court's reasoning, MICRA's $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages will now apply to most cases alleging intentional torts. Id. At least one other author
concurs in this regard, Russell A. Gold, Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v.
Superior Court: Statute Limiting Punitive Damages For the Professional Negligence of Health
Care Providers Includes Intentional Torts, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 621 (1993).
61. The plaintiff in Bommareddy alleged the defendant performed a cataract extraction with
an intraocular lens implant on her right eye without her consent since she had allegedly
consented only to tear duct surgery on her left eye. Bommareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 246.
Plaintiff further alleged that the defendant's actions were "willful, wanton malicious and done
with a conscious disregard for her rights," thereby entitling her to request punitive damages. Id.
at 247 Plaintiff's second cause of action was for negligence and did not request punitive
damages. Id.
62. Id. at 250.
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which "[did] not substantively exist apart from the negligence theory of
recovery. ' 63  Since the plaintiff pleaded her injuries resulted from a
"substantially different surgery than that to which she consented," the court
ruled the plaintiff should not be precluded from claiming punitive damages
since battery is a theory different from negligence and is applicable to only
a limited category of medical malpractice cases.' The court further
rejected Dr. Bommareddy's argument that, since punitive damages are rarely
available in a negligence cause of action, limiting application of section
425.13(a) to causes of action for negligence would make little sense.'
Finally, the court rejected Dr. Bommareddy's argument that the legislative
history and public policy behind the statute supported including intentional
torts within the scope of section 425.13.' Professional negligence, the
court concluded, is a "term of art ... [that] has a specific meaning which
does not include unconsented-to battery upon a patient."67
B. Central Pathology v. Superior Court
In Central Pathology, plaintiffs Constance and Michael Hull filed a
medical malpractice action against several defendants, including Central
63. Id. at 247.
64. Id. at 247 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972)).
65. Bomnareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 247-248. The court explained there was no "bright line
delineating the general availability of punitive damages" based on whether the action sounds in
intentional tort versus negligence. "[C]ourts have not limited the availability of punitive
damages to cases in which [an intent actual intent to harm the plaintiff] has been shown ...
[ln order to justify the imposition of punitive damages, the defendant 'must act with the intent
to vex, injure, or annoy, or with a conscious disregard of the plaintiff's rights.'" Id. at 248
(quoting Taylor v. Superior Court, 598 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1979) (emphasis in original). Cf. Bell
v. Sharp Cabrillo Hospital, 260 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1989) (upholding trial court's refusal to instruct
jury on punitive damages for lack of evidence defendant had consciously disregarded the safety
of others). The court also noted that "the same statute which added Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.13 also expanded the definition of malice found in Civil Code section 3294 to
include 'despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious
disregard of the rights or safety of others.'" Bommareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 248 (quoting Stats.
1987, ch. 1498).
66. Bommareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
From the outset, it seems notable that the legislature chose to specifically regulate
only those actions brought upon a theory of 'professional negligence,' as defined as
a negligent act or omission by a health care provider in the rendering of professional
services which cause personal injuries or wrongful death. Hence a 'malpractice'
action brought on a theory of an unconsented-to-battery upon the patient, breach of
warranty, or other non-negligence theory would apparently be without the ambit of
this legislation.
Id. (citing Selected 1975 California Legislation, supra note 3, at 544, 562).
67. Bornnareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 249. The court also cited with approval Noble v.
Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1987) which, in construing Code of Civil
Procedure section 364, held that professional negligence does not include a cause of action for
battery. See discussion of the Noble decision at infra notes 153-173 and accompanying text.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal, however, declined to follow Bommareddy in Feister v.
Superior Court, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150 (1990).
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Pathology Service Medical Clinic.68 The complaint pleaded causes of action
for medical negligence and loss of consortium based on the failure of the
defendants to timely diagnose and treat cancer in Constance Hull.69
Subsequent to filing the complaint, the Hulls moved for leave to file an
amended complaint alleging causes of action for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress." The Hulls' amended complaint sought
punitive damages.71
Central Pathology opposed the Hulls' motion to amend the complaint on
the grounds that the amended complaint failed to meet the requirements of
section 425.13(a);' specifically, the Hulls would be unable to show a
"substantial probability" of prevailing on the punitive damages claim.7'
The Hulls contended that section 425.13(a) did not apply to the proposed
amendments since those causes of action were not for "professional
negligence."74 Relying on Bommareddy, the trial court granted the motion
to amend, holding section 425.13(a) did not bar punitive damages allegations
against a health care provider on causes of action unrelated to professional
negligence.7' The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.76
68. 832 P.2d at 926.
69. Id. at 926.
70. Id. These new causes of action were based on the fact that defendant Elizabeth Irwin,
M.D., allegedly performed a pap smear on Hull which was sent to Central Pathology for
analysis. Hull alleged that, despite the presence of abnormal cells, Irwin and Central Pathology
failed to notify Hull that she was developing cancer. Hull further alleged that Central
Pathology, after being ordered to retest all persons tested in the past five years, intentionally
failed to notify Hull that she should be retested; and that Irwin denied using Central Pathology
in an effort to cover up her negligence, thus giving rise to a cause of action for fraud. Hull also
alleged that Central Pathology and Irwin acted in an outrageous manner with the intent to cause
severe emotional distress, thus giving rise to a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id.
71. Id.
72. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.13(a) prescribes a procedure for claiming punitive
damages in a malpractice action. That section provides inter alia that:
In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care
provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint or other
pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes
a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an
amended pleading claiming punitive damages on a motion by the party seeking the
amended pleading and on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits
presented that the plaintiff has established that there is a substantial probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section 3294 of the Civil Code....
Id. Such an amended pleading must be filed within two years after the complaint is filed or nine
months before the first trial date, whichever is earlier. Id. The rationale behind section
425.13(a) is that, since most malpractice policies do not cover punitive damages, a request for
punitive damages creates a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured. Accordingly,
before such a claim will be allowed the court will make an initial determination that the claim
has merit.
73. Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 926.
74. Id. at 926-927.
75. Id. at 927 (citing the trial court's opinion).
19941
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1. Interpretation of Section 425.13(a)
The Central Pathology Court began its analysis by looking at the plain
language of section 425.13 which provides:
In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a
health care provider, no claim for punitive damages shall be included in a
complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order allowing an
amended Vleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be
filed....
The Court explained that, since the phrase "arising out of' is "equated with
origination, growth or flow from the event,"78 an intentional tort cause of
action can "arise out of" an action for professional negligence.79 With
respect to the term "professional negligence," the Court turned to the various
MICRA provision which define the term.8' Since the legislature was
familiar with that definition, it was assumed to apply to section 425.13 as
well.8' Next, the Court turned to the legislative history of section 425.13(a)
to determine whether, in the malpractice context, an intentional tort cause of
action could "originate, grow, or flow from an action for 'professional
negligence.' "
Section 425.13 was added to the Code of Civil Procedure by a section
of the Brown-Lockyear Civil Liabilities Reform Act.' In its original form,
section 425.13 was not limited to actions for medical malpractice. s4 Later,
it was amended to apply to "any action.., arising out of the professional
negligence of a health care provider."' The Legislature was concerned
with the overbreadth of the original version of section 425.13 in that it could
76. Id. at 931. The Supreme Court granted review after defendant's petition for a writ of
mandate was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal.
77. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 425.13(a)(emphasis added).
78. Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 931 (citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Civil
Service Employees Ins. Co., 108 Cal. Rptr. 737, 741 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1973) and Palmer v.
Agee, 150 Cal. Rptr. 841, 847 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1978) ("arise" means to originate from a
specified source or to come into being)).
79. Id. The Court analogized prior decisions holding that intentional tort causes of action
can "arise out of" contractual relationships. Id. (citing Stout v. Turney, 586 P.2d 1228 (Cal.
1978) and Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206 (Cal. 1976).
80. 832 P.2d at 928. See supra note 10 for those sections defining "professional
negligence."
81. Id.
82. Id. at 928.
83. Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, §§ 1-7, pp. 5777-5782. The Act provided in part for an
increased evidentiary threshold in order to recover punitive damages ("clear and convincing
evidence of oppression, fraud, or malice"). Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 929.
84. Id. The statute provided inter alia, "[n]o claim for punitive damages against a health
care provider shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unless the court enters an order
allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed." Id.(quoting Stats. 1987, ch. 1498, § 7, p. 5782).
85. Id. (quoting Stats. 1988, ch. 1205, § 1, p. 4028).
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apply to any lawsuit against a health care provider unrelated to providing
professional services, whereas the intent behind the statute was to "provide
protection to health practitioners in their capacity as practitioners."86
The Court concluded section 425.13 was therefore intended to apply only
to lawsuits related to a practitioner's conduct in providing health care related
services.' Although the Assembly Subcommittee expressed the view that
claims for fraud and intentional torts would be claims unrelated to the
practitioner's practice, the Court concluded section 425.13 was nevertheless
intended to cover any lawsuit brought against health practitioners "in their
capacity as practitioners." 88
In reversing Bommareddy, the Court explained the Court of Appeal had
mistakenly focused on the issue of whether "professional negligence" as
defined under MICRA included intentional torts.8 9 "Whether professional
negligence, as defined in MICRA statutes, includes intentional torts is not the
question. Rather, the trial court must determine whether a plaintiff's action
for damages is one 'arising out of the professional negligence of a health care
provider. "I More important, under the Bommareddy court's interpretation
of section 425.13(a), a plaintiff would be able to circumvent the protection
afforded by the statute by artfully pleading a claim for an intentional tort
along with the negligence cause of action and asserting a claim for punitive
damages based only on the intentional tort.91
2. Section 425.13 Applies to Causes of Action "Directly Related" to the
Performance of Professional Services
For purposes of section 425.13, an intentional tort "arises out of' a
claim for negligence when the nature and cause of the injury is "directly
related to the manner in which professional services were provided. "I As
the Court explained:
[Hull's] cause of action for fraud in this case is directly related to the
manner in which defendant's provided professional services. The claim
emanates from the manner in which defendants performed and communi-
cated the results of medical tests, a matter that is an ordinary and usual
part of medical professional services. . . . [Hull's] cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is predicated on the same alleged
facts as the fraud claim. Therefore, it too is directly related to defendants'
86. Id. at 930 (quoting Assem. Subcom. on the Administration of Justice Rep. in Sen. Bill
No. 1420, p. 1 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) (emphasis in original).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 930.
90. Id. (quoting §425.13(a) emphasis in original).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 931.
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performance of professional services and is governed by section
425.13(a). 93
Moreover, the Court held section 425.13 applies whether the complaint
alleges a single cause of action for an intentional tort or states a cause of
action for professional negligence.'
C. Should MICRA Apply to All Torts Which Are "Based On"
Claims for Professional Negligence?
Central Pathology raises several questions regarding MICRA's
interpretation. The first is whether MICRA's provisions should be given a
similar interpretation. Does the language used by the Legislature in drafting
MICRA suggest an intent to cover all torts, intentional or unintentional, that
are committed while performing professional services? If the language used
in those sections would allow such an interpretation, would the policies
behind the statute be furthered by the inclusion of intentional torts? Finally,
if intentional torts are to be covered by MICRA, which types should receive
protection?
The various MICRA provisions all apply to actions "based on"
professional negligence.' Arguably, the same reasoning applied by the
Court in Central Pathology could be applied to the MICRA provisions which
pertain to claims "based on" professional negligence.96 In its amicus curiae
brief before the Central Pathology Court, the California Medical Association
(CMA) contended that the Legislature intended section 425.13 to cover the
same types of actions as MICRA. 7  The legislative history of section
425.13 shows the Legislature looked to the MICRA statutes as precedent in
drafting section 425.13.98 Section 425.13 applies "[i]n any action for
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3333.1 & 3333.2, and CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 364.
96. This same argument was raised by the California Medical Association (CMA) in an
anicus curiae brief filed in Szkorla v. Vecchione. See AmIcus CURIAE BRIEF ON BEHALF OF
CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION, AND CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT at 8. (on file
with California Western Law Review) [hereinafter CMA BRIEF SZKORLA]. The CMA and the
California Association of Hospitals and Health Systems were instrumental in defending MICRA's
constitutionality. Id. at A.
97. AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SYSTEMS, AND CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS, at 3. (on file at California Western Law Review) [hereinafter
CMA BRIEF (Central Pathology)].
98. The comments to the bill state, "[tihere is substantial precedent for SB 1420. The
provisions of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) all pertain to
claims of 'professional negligence.' (See Civil Code Section 3333.1, relating to the collateral
source rule, Civil Code Section 3333.2 relating to limitations on noneconomic losses, Code of
Civil Procedure Section 411.30, relating to Certificates of Merit, and Code of Civil Procedure
Section 667.7, relating to periodic payments of judgments.)" ASSEMB. SUBCOMM. ON THE
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, S.B. 1420, at 1-2.
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damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider."
In comparison, the MICRA statutes apply to actions "based upon profession-
al negligence."99 As the CMA stated in its brief, "[w]hether or not there
is any meaningful linguistic difference between 'based upon' and 'arising out
of' ... the Legislature surely did not intend to make a distinction.... To
the contrary, the Legislature's view of the MICRA language as 'precedent'
demonstrates no distinction was intended."
The Central Pathology Court conceded this point, explaining:
We agree with amici curiae California Medical Association et al. that
commttee reports before the Legislature at the time it was considering
amending section 425.13 indicate the Legislature did not intend to
distinguish the terms "based upon" and "arising out of."" °°
As the Court explained, "[w]e recognize that in the medical malpractice
context, there may be considerable overlap of intentional and negligent
causes of action." 01 If the language "arising out of' can link an intention-
al tort cause of action to a negligence claim, it would seem that an intentional
tort could also be "based on" professional negligence."
The CMA further contended that the difference in the language used in
the various MICRA statutes was the result of "drafting imperfections."
As a result "it would be misleading to read too much into the Legislature's
use of the term 'professional negligence' in the other MICRA statutes. When
read in the context of MICRA's purpose, it is apparent the Legislature would
have expressed its intent more accurately if it had used the term 'professional
99. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (emphasis added). See also, e.g., CAL. Ci. CODE § 3333.2;
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 340.5, 364.
100. Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 928 n.3 (citing Assem. Subcom. on the Administration
of Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1420 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.); Sen. Office of Research, 3d
reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1420 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 14, 1988;
Assem. Office of Research, Sen.3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1420 (1987-1988 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Aug. 30, 1988).
101. 832 P.2d at 931.
102. Id.
103. CMA BRIEF (Central Pathology), supra note 97, at 6. As the brief points out:
No two MICRA provisions use exactly the same language to describe the cases to
which they apply. For example, while Civil Code section 3333.2 (limiting
noneconomic damages to $250,000 applies "[i]n any action for injury against a health
care provider based on professional negligence" (emphasis added), Civil Code section
3333.1 (changing the collateral source rule) applies "in an action for personal injury
against a health care provider based upon professional negligence" (emphasis added),
and Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 (the statute of limitations) applies "[i]n
an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's
alleged professional negligence" (emphasis added). Code of Civil Procedure section
1295 governs contract provisions concerning the arbitration "of any dispute as to
professional negligence of a health care provider" (emphasis added). Despite these
differences, it would be casuistry to argue each provision has a different scope.
1994]
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services' or 'medical malpractice.'""' In fact, the language used in Code
of Civil Procedure section 1295 indicates the Legislature viewed the terms
"professional negligence" and "medical malpractice" as synonymous. 1 5
That section provides for "arbitration of any dispute as to professional
negligence"'" and requires the contract to include warnings about the
arbitrability of "any dispute as to medical malpractice""° and "any issue
of medical malpractice."' Furthermore, Code of Civil Procedure section
667.7 authorizes periodic payment "of judgments in malpractice actions
against health care providers."'" Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5
provides for tolling of the statute of limitations "upon proof of fraud,""0
which is an intentional tort with its own three year statute of limitations."'
Although each of the MICRA provisions provide their own definition
"professional negligence" as a "negligent act or omission, "12 the language
used in the rest of the MICRA statutes shows no clear intent to limit MICRA
to causes of action for negligence.""' These "drafting imperfections"
should not detract from MICRA's overriding purpose to ensure the
availability of health care by making malpractice insurance affordable." 4
III. PRIOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The question of whether MICRA should cover intentional torts has
remained for the most part undecided." 5 All the MICRA provisions
uniformly apply to actions "based on" or "based upon" professional
negligence." 6 Yet, the few decisions which have addressed MICRA's
coverage of intentional torts have not focused on those words as having any
significance with respect to statutory interpretation. Following Central
Pathology, it would seem that the phrase "based on professional negligence"





109. § 667.7(f) (emphasis added).
110. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340.5 (emphasis added).
111. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338. Nevertheless, Nelson v. Gaunt, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167,
171 (Ct. App. 1st Dist 1981) held that a cause of action for fraud is governed by the three year
statute.
112. See supra note 10.
113. CMA BRIEF, (Central Pathology), supra note 97, at 6. The distinction between
"malpractice" and "negligence" is not an insignificant one. Many other malpractice reform
statutes in other states apply to actions for "malpractice" and not just those for "negligence."
See infra note 245 and accompanying text.
114. Id. at 7.
115. As yet, only CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 340.5 and 1295 have been examined by the
courts with respect to coverage of intentional torts.
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should be broadly construed as a whole to include all malpractice torts
regardless of the level of intent involved and thus better effect MICRA's
statutory purpose of lowering health care costs." 7 As the Central Patholo-
gy Court explained:
To ensure that the legislative intent underlying MICRA is implemented, we
have recognized that the scope of conduct afforded protection under
MICRA provisions (actions "based on professional negligence") must be
determined after consideration of the purpose underlying each of the
individual statutes.... Absent any indication that the Legislature intended
othenvise in using the term "arising out of professional negligence" in
section 425.13, we must do the same here. 1
Curiously the Court cites Waters v. Bourhis'19 and Hedlund v. Superior
Court"z for the proposition that the phrase "based on" was given an
interpretation consistent with its statutory purpose in those cases and a similar
interpretation should be applied to the words "arising out of' in order to
conclude that intentional torts should be covered by section 425.13.121
However, while the Court in Hedlund broadly construed the phrase
professional negligence to encompass a claim for failure to warn, Waters
introduced a certain amount of confusion to the issue of which torts are
covered by MICRA and which are not.
A. Waters v. Bourhis and "Hybrid" Recoveries
In Waters v. Bourhis," the California Supreme Court held that the
limitation on contingency fees"s does not apply where a plaintiff proceeds
both on claims of professional negligence and intentionally tortious conduct,
and obtains a recovery that might be based on either claim. 24 However,
117. Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 931.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. 709 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1985) (refusing to apply contingency fee limitation to "hybrid"
action alleging professional negligence and intentional tortious conduct).
120. 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983) (including allegations of negligent failure to warn within the
definition of "professional negligence" for purposes of the statute of limitations).
121. Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 931. At least one court of appeal has declined to apply
such a broad interpretation. In Western Steamship Lines v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, the
court held that an employer's claim for implied equitable indemnity was not a legal theory
"arising out of" or "based on" the professional negligence of a health care provider. 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 611, 616 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1993).
122. 709 P.2d 469. Justice Kaus delivered the majority opinion in which Justices Broussard,
Reynoso, Grodin, and Lucas concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Bird concurred. Justice Kaus, a retired associate justice was sitting under assignment by
the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
123. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146.
124. 709 P.2d at 475-77.
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a close reading of the Waters decision supports the conclusion that MICRA
should cover intentional torts.'15
Waters brought an action against her attorney who had represented her
in an earlier suit against a psychiatrist who had allegedly seduced Waters
while she was his patient contending her attorney had collected a contingency
fee which exceeded the maximum permitted by section 6146." Waters'
complaint in the earlier action alleged her psychiatrist induced her to engage
in sexual conduct suggesting it was part of therapy designed to alleviate her
sexual inhibitions.127  After terminating her therapy and assisting in
criminal prosecution of her psychiatrist, Waters consulted an attorney to file
a civil action seeking recovery on several legal theories."~ Water's
complaint alleged (1) negligence, (2) breach of duty of good faith, and (3)
intentional infliction of emotional distress.19  The suit was eventually
settled for policy limits from which Waters' attorney collected his fee.13°
Waters then sued alleging her attorney had obtained a fee greater than he was
entitled to under section 6146.131
The Court began its analysis by noting that "section 6146's limitations
... do not apply to all types of actions against doctors or other 'health care
providers' but-like other provisions of MICRA--only to actions which are
'based upon [the provider's] alleged professional negligence.' '1 32 Howev-
er, "MICRA's reference to actions based on 'professional negligence' is not
strictly limited to classic sponge-in-the-patient medical malpractice ac-
tions.113  Next, the Court explained that Waters' suit against the psychia-
trist was not limited to an intentional tort theory but could also contain
allegations of professional malpractice as well."M Accordingly, Waters'
125. So argued in CMA BPJEF (Szkorla), supra note 96, at 9.
126. 709 P.2d at 471.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 472. The defendant offered to represent Waters' case on either an hourly rate
of $50 or $65 per hour or on a contingency fee basis "which provided for fees of (1) 33'1/
percent if recovery was obtained before the filing of a lawsuit, and (2) 40 percent after such a
suit was filed." Plaintiff told him that she wanted to be represented on a contingency basis and
signed the contingency fee agreement that defendant had prepared. Id.
129. Id. The third count alleged the psychiatrist's actions "'constitute[d] outrageous,
unlawful, harmful and offensive conduct' and that they were undertaken with the 'intention of
causing or recklessly disregarding the possibility of causing emotional distress to the plaintiff.'"
Id. at 472 n.4.
130. Id. at 473.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 473-74. The Court ruled that Waters' allegations of sexual conduct gave rise to
a cause of action for "professional negligence" as well as intentional tortious conduct citing
numerous out-of-state decisions finding liability on such a basis. Id. at 475. For the full text
defining "professional negligence" see supra note 10.
133. Id. at 475 (citing Hedlund v. Superior Court, 669 P.2d 41 (1983)).
134. Id. at 476. Where a psychiatrist intentionally abuses the therapist-patient relationship,
the psychiatrist has breached both the duty imposed on everyone to refrain from intentionally
injuring another and the special duty that a psychiatrist owes to his patient to use due care for
the patient's health in the conduct of the therapist-patient relationship." Id.
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recovery was based at least in part on a theory of professional negli-
gence. 135
However, because the underlying suit had been settled, no determination
had been made with regard to the theory on which the recovery was
based." 6 The Court therefore concluded that, "when a plaintiff pursues
and recovers on a non-MICRA cause of action, it is reasonable to conclude
that section 6146's attorney fee limits should not apply, even if the plaintiff
at the same time also succeeds on a separate MICRA cause of action." 37
The case was therefore reversed to resolve the factual question over "whether
plaintiff knowingly consented to the pursuit and settlement of a cause of
action that would not be subject to the limitations of section 6146."'Il
The Court therefore treated Waters' earlier lawsuit as a "hybrid" claim
"based on both non-MICRA and MICRA causes of action."139 Implicit in
the reversal was the acknowledgement that the recovery rested at least in part
on a "non-MICRA" theory. This analysis is problematic since the Court,
while implying that such a "non-MICRA" theory exists, does not define what
type of theory would fall outside MICRA. On the surface it appears that the
Court considered the allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress
(an intentional tort) to be a "non-MICRA" claim and the allegation of
professional negligence to naturally be a MICRA claim. However, the
Court's separation of Water's lawsuit into MICRA and non-MICRA theories
is less than clear. "
More significantly, the Court sidestepped the question of whether certain
intentional torts are covered by MICRA. As the Court explained:
135. Id. at 476.
136. Id. at 477.
137. Id. at 478.
138. Id. at 479.
139. Id. at 477 (emphasis in original).
140. Traditionally, there can be only one recovery for a single injury no matter how many
theories a plaintiff may prevail upon to recover against the defendant. Accordingly, it would
be improper to apportion a different amount of damages to each cause of action.
Separation of the plaintiff's lawsuit into MICRA and non-MICRA causes of action creates
further problems. As one author points out,
The court's holding could result in many p~rsonal injury attorneys asserting both
MICRA and non-MICRA actions in order to avoid the limitations of section 6146.
If the case goes to trial, the cause of action that succeeds will determine whether
section 6146 applies. However, in the case of a settlement, the limits of section 6146
could be avoided because settlements do not establish on which theory the recovery
is based. This could be an area for potential abuse of the limitations imposed by
MICRA in malpractice actions. The provision that the plaintiff must knowingly
consent to proceed on both theories will hopefully provide a check for potential abuse
by attorneys.
Marie P. Henwood, California Supreme Court Survey: The Contingency Fee Limitations of
MICRA Does [sic] Not Apply Where a Plaintiff Knowingly Chooses to Proceed on Both Non-
MICRA and MICRA Theories in the Same Suit, and Subsequently Obtains a Recovery on the
Non-MICRA Theory, 13 PEPP. L. Rnv. 1106, 1110 (1986).
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Amicus California Hospital Association argues that "professional negli-
gence" in section 6146 and other MICRA provisions should be construed
to encompass not only "negligent" acts of a health care provider but also
those "intentional" acts of such a provider which are insurable under
Insurance Code section 533 ....
We have no occasion in this case to decide whether amicus' proposed
construction is an appropriate interpretation of the statutory language.
Because the initial lawsuit against the psychiatrist was settled, the record
does not establish whether the psychiatrist's conduct falls into the
"uninsurable" as opposed to the insurable category, any more than it
establishes whether his conduct was "intentional" rather than "negligent."
Thus, even if amicus' suggested reading of the statute were proper, it
would not affect the result in this case. 4
Therefore, assuming such a distinction exists, is a "non-MICRA" tort
one that is "uninsurable" or one that is "intentional"? It would make sense
for one defining criterion to be insurability; since the primary purpose of
MICRA is to protect malpractice insurers from paying out large awards.142
This must be considered the proper holding of Waters. If intent alone were
the sole criteria, the Court could have resolved the issue by simply holding
that intentional torts are not covered under MICRA. Instead, the Court in
the foregoing paragraph expressly declined to address the issue leaving its
resolution for another day.
If insurability is one criteria for MICRA coverage that is to be gleaned
from the Waters opinion, the second criteria must be the existence of a
therapeutic motive on the part of the health care provider. 43 The Waters
Court confined its analysis to the particular facts before it; where "the
plaintiff's recovery in the earlier suit was based on intentional misconduct in
which the psychiatrist engaged for personal, as opposed to professional,
motives. "'a Thus, a nontherapeutic motive appears to be the second
defining criteria in determining whether a cause of action is governed by
MICRA. 145
As Waters again shows, an analysis focusing solely on the term
"professional negligence" is misplaced. Since such torts are insurable," s
141. Id. at 476-77 n. 11 (citations omitted). Some intentional torts are insurable under CAL.
INS. CODE § 533. Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098, 1110 (Cal. 1978) ("... . an
act which is 'intentional' or 'wilful' within the meaning of traditional tort principles will not
exonerate the insurer from liability . . . unless it is done with a 'preconceived design to inflict
injury.'") See discussion at infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 71.
143. The proposition that a malpractice reform statute should cover all torts which are
related to the performance of the health care provider's professional duties has been the basis
for several out of state opinions. See infra section IV.B.
144. Waters, 709 P.2d at 475 (first emphasis in original, second added); CMA BRIEF
(Szkorla), supra note 96, at 10-11.
145. CMA BRIEF (Szkorla), supra note 96, at 11.
146. CAL. INS. CODE § 533. Cf. Overton, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 848-50 (criminal conviction
for battery does not in and of itself preclude insurance coverage).
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coverage under MICRA would help further the policy of ensuring affordable
health care. 147
Many medical malpractice cases include legal theories other than negli-
gence, such as technical battery. Those non-negligence theories, however,
are inextricably related to the rendering of professional services and are
covered by medical malpractice insurance. An interpretation of MICRA
that narrowly limits its application to a legal theory of negligence ascribes
to the Legislature the intent to subject health care providers and their
insurers to increased liability in a significant category of medical malprac-
tice cases. This would add to the costs of medical malpractice insurers and
undercut MICRA's crucial purpose of ensuring the availability of health
care and the enforceability of judgments against health care providers by
making medical malpractice insurance affordable. Such a narrow
construction of the phrase "based upon professional negligence" is
inconsistent with the overriding legislative intent.148
Under Waters, a theory is non-MICRA only if the practitioner is engaged
in conduct for personal as opposed to professional motives. 49  The
distinction between whether a tort is MICRA or non-MICRA should not be
based on whether a tort is "intentional."' 0 After all, "intent" for purposes
of the commission of an intentional tort does not require an intent to do
harm, only an intent to do the act which results in harm.'
Therefore, the distinction between negligence and intentional tort is
insufficient to distinguish a MICRA from a non-MICRA tort. Rather,
MICRA should exclude only intentional torts committed with a
nontherapeutic motive. The test to determine MICRA's applicability
should be similar to the test used to determine whether certain conduct is
covered by the health care provider's malpractice insurance.
147. As the CMA argued in its brief before the Fourth District in Szkorla:
In our view, in the context of health care, the 'preconceived design to inflict injury'
test [the test for noninsurability under section 533] is not significantly different from
the 'nontherapeutic motive' test. If a health care provider's motive is nontherapeutic,
a preconceived design to inflict injury generally should be inferable as a matter of
law.
CMA BRIEF (Szkorla), supra note 96, at 11 n.10.
148. CMA BRIEF (Central Pathology) supra note 97, at 10.
149. See supra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
150. CMA BRIEF (Szkorla), supra note 96, at 119. "'Motive' is different from 'intent.'
'Intent' is the word commonly used to describe the purpose to bring about stated physical
consequences; the more remote objective which inspires the act and the intent is called
'motive.' . . . [Mjotive ... [is concerned with] reasons for desiring certain consequences." Id.
(quoting PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 8, p. 35 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis added).
151. "The intent with which tort liability [for intentional torts] is concerned is not
necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a
result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids." PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 150, at 36.
152. CMA BRIEF (Szkorla), supra note 96, at 13.
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However, the lower courts of appeal have not given MICRA such a
broad interpretation. As noted above, the Bommareddy court focused very
exclusively on the term "professional negligence" as a term of art which does
not include intentional torts. Noble v. Superior Court,' followed a very
similar reasoning. There, the Second District Court of Appeal held the
tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 364 51 applied only
to negligence causes of action and not to those based on intentional torts as
to which the limitations period has run. 5
In Noble, the plaintiff 56 filed a "Notice of Intention to Commence Ac-
tion," prior to the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations"5 7 which
advised the defendant of her intention to commence an action against
him.'58  On May 9, 1986, Noble filed a complaint which included a cause
of action for battery." 9  Subsequently, Noble filed a First Amended
Complaint on August 29, 1986, seeking damages based upon several
negligence theories' 6t as well as battery.' 61  The defendant demurred to
the cause of action for battery on the grounds it was barred by the statute of
limitations.162
On appeal, Noble contended her cause of action for battery was based
upon the same facts as the negligence cause of action and therefore the
tolling provisions of section 364(d) 61 should also extend the one-year
period for battery"6 which otherwise would expire on April 22, 1986.165
The court of appeal, however, ruled the 90-day tolling provisions of section
153. Noble v. Superior Court, 237 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1987).
154. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 364 provides for a 90 day notice to commence a malpractice
action against a health care provider.
155. Noble, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
156. CAL. CIV. CODE § 340.5. See discussion at supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
157. As required per CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 364(a). See supra note 130.
158. Noble, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
159. Id. This cause of action was undoubtedly based on the allegation that Dr. Katz had
exceeded the scope of the surgery to which Noble had consented.
160. Those theories were: medical malpractice, lack of informed consent, negligence, and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
161. Id.
162. Id. The statute of limitations is one year under section 340.5 with respect to the causes
of action for professional negligence. The battery cause of action would be governed by Code
of Civil Procedure section 340(3).
As the court explained the running of the statute with respect to each of Noble's claims:
"Because Noble filed her notice of intent within 90 days of the end of the one-year period
(which ordinarily would have run on April 22, 1986), the limitations period was extended for
90 days, until July 21, 1986. Her complaint filed on May 9, 1986, was therefore timely filed
as to the causes of action sounding in negligence." Id.
163. Subsection (d) provides that a "Notice of Intention to Commence Action" filed within
90 days of the end of the limitations period, tolls the statute for 90 days. See supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
164. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340(3).
165. Noble, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
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364 apply only to negligence causes of action. 66 The court further rejected
Noble's argument that her cause of action for battery was "merely an
alternative theory based upon the same set of facts as her negligence causes
of action." 67 The court concluded "the words 'negligent' and 'negligence'
were carefully chosen to apply to only causes of action based upon
negligence." 16  The court reasoned this interpretation would be consistent
with the policies underlying MICRA since an opposite construction would
have the effect of lengthening the statute with respect to a cause of action for
battery.
169
However, the Central Pathology court accepted the argument the court
of appeal rejected in Noble; that a cause of action for battery is merely an
alternative theory based on the same facts as the negligence cause of
action. 70 Arguably, the analysis in the Noble decision is faulty since the
166. Id. In Brown v. Bleiberg, the Supreme Court held (without much analysis) that the
statute of limitations for professional negligence did not apply to the plaintiff's causes of action
for battery and breach of warranty. 651 P.2d 815, 820 (Cal. 1982). The court held that the
plaintiff's claims for battery and breach of warranty were not barred by the one year statute of
limitations set forth in CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 340 (3), because there was a question of fact
as to when the plaintiff should have discovered that the defendants had performed unauthorized
surgery on her foot. Id. at 822. The court held that the plaintiffs claim for professional
negligence was not tolled by the outside three year statute of limitations in CAL. CODE CiV.
PROC. § 340.5 because of the physician's affirmative misrepresentations regarding the nature of
the surgery. Id. at 821.
167. Id. (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, for the proposition that there are significant
differences between the theories of battery and negligence). Cf. Herrera v. Superior Court, 204
Cal. Rptr. 553 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984) (citing Cobbs for the proposition that the legislature in
drafting statute providing for arbitration agreements in malpractice cases, recognized a
malpractice action can include theories other than negligence, such as a battery).
168. Noble, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
The distinction between negligence and battery was not lost on our Supreme Court
[in Cobbs v. Grant], and we do not believe it was lost on the Legislature when it
enacted section 364 as a limited exception to the statute of limitations for "profession-
al negligence." Had the legislature intended section 364, subdivision (d), to extend
to causes of action based upon other theories which the plaintiff might wish to include
in the complaint, it could have used language which reflected that intent. It did not.
Id. at 41 (emphasis in original).
169. Id. "mhe provisions of MICRA relating to the statute of limitations... use the more
limiting terms 'professional negligence' and 'negligent act or omission to act.' We view this as
a deliberate choice, consistent with MICRA's goal of reducing the number of medical
malpractice actions filed. The legislature specifically reduced the limitations period for such
actions from four to three years. Noble's contention that section 364, subdivision (d) expanded
the limitations period for battery is inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of MICRA."
Id. at 40 (emphasis in original).
170. Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 931.
We recognize that in the medical malpractice context, there may be considerable
overlap of intentional and negligent causes of action. Because acts supporting a
negligence cause of action might also support a cause of action for an intentional tort,
we have not limited application of MICRA provisions to causes of action that are
based solely on a "negligent act or omission" as provided in these statutes. ...
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court there focused on the exclusive nature of the term "professional
negligence" as a term of art without considering whether the preceding
phrase "based upon" present in both sections 340.5 and 364 expanded the
scope of the statute.'' Furthermore, the Noble court held extending the
statute of limitations for battery claims would be inconsistent with MICRA's
purpose. 'T However, the court failed to recognize that including a cause
of action for an intentional tort within MICRA as an action "based upon
professional negligence" would allow other MICRA protections to apply."
Other cases interpreting the difference between Code of Civil Procedure
340 (3) (applicable to battery and breach of warranty), 74 and Code of Civil
Procedure section 340.5 (applicable to actions "based upon... professional
negligence") have created just the opposite result. In Brown v. Bleiberg,7 5
the court observed that only the plaintiff's cause of action for professional
negligence was subject to the absolute three year bar of section 340.5.176
However, the court held it was error to grant summary judgment with
respect to plaintiff's causes of action for battery and breach of warranty
because there was a factual issue whether the plaintiff discovered the
defendant's tortious conduct before the statute of limitations had run.11
In Nelson v. Gaunt,17 the court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in holding that the plaintiff's cause of action for fraud was
• . . [I]dentifying a cause of action as an "intentional tort" as opposed to "negli-
gence" does not itself remove the claim from the requirements of section 425.13(a).
Id. (emphasis added).
171. See Noble, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 40. The court notes that sections 364 and 340.5 apply
to "actions against a health care provider based upon the provider's alleged 'professional
negligence,' which is defined as 'a negligent act or omission to act.'" Id. (emphasis in original).
However, this is precisely the focus taken by the Bonmareddy court: "'[Tihe term 'professional
negligence' [is] a more limited one and the choice of its use deliberate." Bommareddy, 272 Cal.
Rptr. at 250 (citing with approval Noble, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 40). In concluding that the phrase
"professional negligence" was a deliberately chosen term of art, both courts failed to consider
whether the words "based upon" were the result of a deliberate choice intended to expand the
scope of the statute. Analysis based solely on the term "professional negligence" is misplaced.
See Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 930.
172. Noble, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
173. Specifically, the cap on noneconomic damages (CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2) and the
limitation on contingency fees (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146) would apply. Although
holding a claim to be barred by the statute provides the greatest possible protection since
naturally the claim cannot be brought at all. Consistency would dictate that all the MICRA
provisions should apply with some uniformity. As a legislative scheme, MICRA should attempt
the greatest overall reduction in judgments against health care providers. With respect to a cause
of action for battery, the statute would only be extended by 90 days, whereas the other
limitations imposed by MICRA would still apply. At best, the Noble and Brown decisions
display a result-oriented analysis.
174. Brown, 651 P.2d at 817 n.1.
175. 651 P.2d 815 (Cal. 1982).
176. Id. at 820.
177. Id. at 821-22. Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 extends the outside three year
period upon proof of fraud. Therefore, "the outside limitations period of section 340.5 was
tolled by its own terms." Id. at 821.
178. 178 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1981).
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governed by the three year statute of limitations for fraud, and was therefore
not barred by the one year period in section 340.5.179 The result of such
reasoning is that a patient's claim against her physician for battery or breach
of warranty could be tolled indefinitely,1 ° whereas a claim for professional
negligence would be barred after three years absent fraud, intentional
concealment, or the presence of a nontherapeutic foreign body. This result,
with its attendant effect on malpractice policy "tails," was surely unintended
by the Legislature when MICRA was enacted. 8 '
Finally, in Szkorla v. Vecchione," a decision ultimately depublished
by the Supreme Court," the Fourth District Court of Appeal held the cap
on noneconomic damages imposed by Civil Code section 3333.2 did not
apply to a cause of action for battery. " Although Szkorla cannot be cited
or relied on as an authority," the decision is useful as a reflection of the
state of the law prior to Central Pathology."'86 "We begin our analysis in
the judicial twilight zone otherwise known as depublished cases."" 8
Szkorla sued her physician, Dr. Thomas Vecchione, following a series
of three breast reduction surgeries, alleging that in the third surgery
Vecchione removed too much tissue, leaving her disfigured.' A jury
returned special verdicts against Vecchione on theories of professional
179. Id. at 174. The court observed: "The 1975 amendments to Code of Civil Procedure
section 340.5, which narrowly define professional negligence, indicate that the Legislature
attempted to curb fraud by health care providers by another route." The former section 340.5,
added by Statutes of 1970, chapter 360, section 1, then covered any "action for injury or death
against a physician . . . based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, or for
rendering professional services without consent, or for error or omission in such person's
practice." Id. In noting the changes in the two versions of the statute, the court may have read
too much into the language used there. All the MICRA sections defining professional negligence
differ slightly. See supra notes 103-114 and accompanying text.
180. In Brown, the plaintiff's cause of action lay dormant for 13 years. The court held that
it was error to start summary judgment on the plaintiffs claims that were not based on
professional negligence because there was a question of fact as to when the claim accrued.
Brown, 651 P.2d at 820.
181. See Steingart v. Oliver, 243 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1988), which
outlines the history of delayed discovery and "long tail" problems in California malpractice
actions, from 1936 onward.
182. 283 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1991), review granted, 286 Cal. Rptr. 779, 818 P.2d 62 (Cal.
1991), reprinted for tracking pending review, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1208 (4th Dist. 1991).
183. See discussion of the Court's depublication practice and its implications for the Szkorla
decision, 283 Cal. Rptr. 219 (1991), review granted, 286 Cal. Rptr. 779, 818 P.2d 62 (Cal.
1991).
184. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
185. CAL. RULE OF COURT § 977(a).
186. Central Pathology arguably has effectively reversed Szkorla. There is some speculation
that the Court intends to address the issues raised in Szkorla at a future date. See supra note 60.
187. In re Bosacki, 213 Cal. Rptr. 834, 836 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1985).
188. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 220-223.
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negligence, lack of informed consent and battery.'89 Szkorla was awarded
$600,000 in general damages and $17,430 in special damages." Vec-
chione appealed, contending the award of $600,000 should have been
reduced pursuant to section 3333.2.19
On appeal, Vecchione argued section 3333.2 limits noneconomic
damages in any case against a health care provider."l Vecchione contend-
ed that the Legislature, in enacting MICRA, intended to include all cases
involving professional medical services and did not intend to distinguish
between negligence and intentional torts."9  The court disagreed. In so
ruling, the court relied on Waters v. Bourhis1 9 for the proposition that "in
a non-MICRA action the plaintiff is not subject to (1) the $250,000 limit on
noneconomic damages." "95 The court also read Waters to hold that "the
provisions of MICRA do not apply to a recovery based on both professional
negligence and an intentional tort." 196 The court also relied on Bomm-
areddy"9 ' for the proposition that the term "'professional negligence' . . .
has a specific meaning which does not include unconsented-to battery upon
189. Id. at 223. Specifically, the jury returned the following special verdicts:
(1) Vecchione was negligent in the medical care and treatment of Szkorla; (2) Such
negligence was a proximate cause of damage to Szkorla; (3) Vecchione did not
disclose all relevant information which would enable Szkorla to make an informed
decision regarding the proposed operation; (4) a reasonable prudent person in
Szkorla's position would have not consented to the operation if such person had been
adequately informed of all the significant perils involved; (5) Vecchione performed
a substantially different operation than the operation to which Szkorla consented; (6)Szkorla sustained $600,000 in damages for pain and suffering, and (7) Szkorlasustained $17,430 in special damages.
Id. Note that the jury awarded damages based on both negligence and intentional tort theories.
Query whether this is a "hybrid" recovery under Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469, 473 (Cal.
1985).
190. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 223. The special damages awarded reflected the cost of
future medical care. Id. at 220.
191. Id. at 223. Trial judges generally have allowed juries to determine noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases without regard to the $250,000 limit. If the award
exceeds $250,000 it is reduced by the judge. See generally McAdory v. Rogers, 264 Cal. Rptr.
71 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989) (upholding the practice); accord Atkins v. Strayhorn, 273 Cal.
Rptr. 231, 236-37 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1990).
192. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
193. Id.
194. 709 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1985).
195. Id. at 228 (quoting Waters, 709 P.2d at 478). The court reads more into this sentence
than was intended by the Supreme Court. First, this statement out of Waters is merely dicta
since it was not necessary to the Court's holding in that case. The Waters court expressly
reserved ruling on the issue of whether a "technical battery" would be covered by MICRA.
Waters, 476 P.2d at 476-77 n.11. Second, the Waters opinion never defines what constitutes
a "non-MICRA" theory. See supra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
196, Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 228. See also Flores v. Natividad Medical Center, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 24 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1987) (concluding it is not proper to apply the damage cap of
section 3333.2 where one of the causes of action is outside the scope of MICRA).
197. 272 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990) rev'd, Central Pathology Service Med. Clinic v. Superior
Court, 832 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1992).
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a patient. 1 Accordingly, the court rejected the argument that construing
the statute to include causes of action based on technical battery would be
consistent with the legislative purpose of the statute in controlling medical
malpractice insurance costs. 99 Nevertheless, all of these arguments were
accepted by the Supreme Court in another context in Central Pathology.'
Thus, the court in Szkorla treated the issue as having already been
resolved by prior law.' However, if the issue had been resolved by prior
decisions, the Supreme Court in Waters would not have reserved ruling on
the issue of whether a "technical battery"-a battery motivated by a
therapeutic purpose-would be covered by MICRA. 2°  And, since the
result in Szkorla was disapproved of by the Supreme Court through depubli-
cation, 3 the Court has thereby reserved issue of whether MICRA covers
claims for "technical battery."
B. Cases Holding MICRA Covers Intentional Torts
Herrera v. Superior Court,2' and Baker v. Sadick, °5 addressed the
issue of whether Code of Civil Procedure section 129525 governing the
means by which a physician and patient may agree that any dispute regarding
claims for malpractice shall be submitted to arbitration, extends to cover
actions other than those for "professional negligence." In both cases, the
198. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 229-230 (quoting Bommareddy, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 249).
199. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 230; CMA BRIEF (Szkorla), supra note 96, at 4.
200. See supra notes 68-114 and accompanying iext.
201. Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 230. "In the face of the above-cited authority, Vecchione
contends that the language of section 3333.2 supports his position." Id.
202. See note 125 supra and accompanying text. The court in Szkorla makes mention of
Waters in this regard noting:
ITihe Waters court explicitly declined to consider a similar theory, namely "that
'professional negligence' in [Business and Professions Code] section 6146 and other
MICRA provisions should be construed to encompass not only 'negligent' . . . but
also those intentional acts of such a provider which are insurable under Insurance
Code section 533 . . ." [Citations] The Waters court noted that the record did not
establish whether the physician's conduct fell "into the 'uninsurable' as opposed to
the 'insurable' category, any more than it establishes whether his conduct was
'intentional' rather than 'negligent.'" Similarly, nothing in the record here establishes
whether Vecchione's battery of Szkorla is covered by insurance.
Szkorla, 283 Cal. Rptr. at 231. The record also did not indicate whether he committed the
battery intentionally. Id.
203. See supra note 58.
204. 204 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1984).
205. 208 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1984).
206. See supra note 49.
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courts of appeal concluded the patient's entire claim including allegations of
intentional torts as well as negligent acts, was subject to arbitration.a "
In Herrera, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging professional
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. s The defendants
answered alleging as an affirmative defense plaintiff's action could not
proceed since it was subject to arbitration as provided in a written agree-
ment. 9  Thereafter, plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to include
several causes of action for intentional torts.210 Following the amendment,
the defendant sought a petition requiring plaintiff to arbitrate the entire
controversy and to stay the action. The defendants contended all the claims
were based on improper treatment, and thus were subject to arbitration under
the agreement. 21' The petition was granted and the plaintiff appealed
contending section 1295 contemplates arbitration only of a physician's
negligent acts and not their intentional torts.21
At the outset the Herrera court noted the policy behind the enactment of
section 1295 was the reduction of malpractice claims through arbitration.1 3
The court also explained, while the statute specifies the language to be used
in the arbitration contract as governing "any dispute as to professional
negligence" which is "a negligent act or omission which proximately causes
injury or death,"2"4 the patient agrees to arbitrate "any dispute as to
medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services rendered
under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized or were improperly,
negligently or incompetently rendered. ' 215  Thus, the statute's own defini-
tion of malpractice includes conduct traditionally a basis for both negligence
and intentional torts .216 "Moreover, it is settled law that a malpractice
action can include theories other than negligence, such as battery, breach of
207. Herrera, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 557-558; Baker, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 681. In Baker, the court
held an agreement pursuant to section 1295 which provides for arbitration of "any" issue of
medical malpractice authorizes the arbitrator to award punitive damages in the arbitration of a
medical malpractice claim. 208 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
208. Herrera, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
209. Id.
210. Id. Plaintiff sought to amend her complaint on the basis of newly discovered facts
which indicated the defendant did not perform the surgery he had claimed to perform, and thus
committed a battery. Those causes of action were (1) assault and battery, (2) fraud and deceit,
(3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) lack of informed consent, (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and (6) unjust enrichment. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 555.
213. Id. at 556. See also supra note 48.
214. Id. at 556-57 (quoting § 1295(a) and (g)(2) respectively).
215. Id. (quoting § 1295(a)). For the full text of the statute see supra note 96.
216. Id. at 557. "'It is perhaps worthy of note that this section purportedly regulates only
those contracts for the arbitration of professional negligence, yet the mandatory clauses clearly
contain language to cover other theories of recovery." 1d. (citing Selected 1975 California
Legislation, supra note 3, at 551).
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contract and deceit."217 The court further explained that the term "profes-
sional negligence" was intended only to set the "threshold of the type of
action in which the arbitration provision will be used."2"8 Finally, "the
language which the Legislature specified must be included in the arbitration
provision shows that the Legislature intended arbitration of disputes over
medical services to extend beyond negligence. "219
In Baker v. Saddick, the plaintiff's claim was also based on intentional
tort principles.' The Fourth District Court of Appeal held section 1295,
which provides for arbitration of "any" issue of medical malpractice,
authorizes an arbitrator to award punitive damages.2 1 On petition from the
arbitration award, the superior court reduced the award for compensatory
damages pursuant to Civil Code section 3333.2m to $250,000. Simi-
lar to the plaintiff in Szkorla, Baker's claim was based upon damages arising
out of a breast reduction surgery performed by the defendant.2 4 Curious-
ly, Baker did not seek review of the superior court's application of section
3333.2 to her award which was based on her claim for intentional torts; an
argument that might have met with success given the Fourth District's
holding in Szkorla v. Vecchione' s seven years later.
IV. COVERAGE OF INTENTIONAL TORTS UNDER ICRA: A PROPOSAL
MICRA's policy of ensuring affordable health care through a reduction
of malpractice insurance rates would undoubtedly be furthered by an
interpretation of MICRA that provides for coverage of all malpractice torts
whether intentional or unintentional. Tortious conduct which falls within the
217. Id. (citing respectively, Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); Depenbrok v. Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, 144 Cal. Rptr. 724 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1964); Weinstock v. Eissler, 36
Cal. Rptr. 537 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1964)).
218. Id. at 558.
219. Id. As noted above, this difference in language shows that the wording of other
sections of MICRA were perhaps the result of "drafting imperfections." See supra notes 103-
114 and accompanying text.
220. Baker, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 681. Baker claimed "[tihe surgery was unnecessary; she was
fraudulently induced to submit to surgery; Sadick falsified Baker's medical records; Sadick's
surgical techniques were negligent; Baker received negligent post-operative management; and
her consent to surgery was uniformed." Id.
221. Id. at 678.
222. See supra note 26.
223. Id. at 678. The defendant was ordered by the arbitration panel to pay Baker the
following sums:
1. For medical expenses incurred to date: $8,769.11
2. For future medical expenses: $1,200.00
3. Compensatory damages: $275,000.00
4. Punitive damages: $300,000.00
5. Attorney's fees: $100,163.40
6. For costs of suit upon proper application. Id.
224. Id. Baker suffered serious post-operative infections resulting in tissue death and
scarring necessitating extensive reconstructive surgery.
225. 283 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1991).
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scope of services for which a provider is licensed should be covered;
regardless of the legal theory alleged. However, health care providers who
commit torts outside the scope of their professional services should not
receive protection since such torts have no connection to providing profes-
sional services.
If intentional torts are to be covered under MICRA as torts "arising out
of" or "based on" professional negligence, which types of tortious conduct
should receive protection? Clearly the purpose behind MICRA would be
furthered if coverage under the Act was broadened.' However, such
additional protection would come at the cost of limiting plaintiffs' recoveries.
Therefore, a balance is required. 7
Furthermore, because the primary purpose behind enacting MICRA was
to ensure the availability and affordability of health care by lowering
malpractice insurance rates,' the criteria used to determine coverage
under MICRA should be similar to the criteria used to determine whether
such an act is insurable under the provider's malpractice policy. Sound
public policy dictates that certain "willful" or "intentional" acts be excluded
from coverage under insurance policies including policies for malpractice
insuranceY 9 A "wilful" act must be done with preconceived design to
226. See supra notes 68 and 71 and accompanying text.
227. As the Supreme Court, addressing the constitutionality of Civil Code section 3333.2,
in Fein explained:
Faced with the prospect that, in the absence of some cost reduction, medical
malpractice plaintiffs might as a realistic matter have difficulty collecting judgments
for any of their damages-pecuniary as well as nonpecuniary-the Legislature
concluded that it was in the public interest to attempt to obtain some cost savings by
limiting noneconomic damages.
695 P.2d at 681 (emphasis in original).
As the Fein Court pointed out elsewhere:
Thoughtful jurists and legal scholars have for some time raised serious questions as
to the wisdom of awarding damages for pain and suffering in any negligence case,
noting, inter alia, the inherent difficulties in placing a monetary value on such losses,
the fact that money damages are at best only imperfect compensation for such
tangible injuries and that such damages are generally passed on to, and borne by,
innocent consumers. While the general propriety of such damages is, of course
firmly embedded in our common law jurisprudence, no California case of which we
are aware has ever suggested that the right to recover for such noneconomic injuries
is constitutionally immune from legislative limitation or revision.
Id.
228. See supra notes 20 and 23 and accompanying text.
229. This policy is embodied in CAL. INS. CODE § 533 which provides: "An insurer is not
liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured. . . ." The purpose of the statute is to
discourage wilful torts. California Casualty Management Company v. Martocchio, 15 Cal. Rptr.
2d 277, 281 (Ct. App. ist Dist. 1992) An analysis of whether an act would be covered when
the insurer and insured's interpretations of the policy language differ is beyond the scope of this
article. For an outstandingly thorough analysis of the history of insurance contract interpretation
in California, see John L. Romaker & Virgil B. Prieto, Expectations Lost: Bank of the West
v. Superior Court Places the Fox in Charge of the Henhouse, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 83 (1992).
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inflict injury as opposed to those nonmalicious acts committed solely to do
the act which caused harm." Thus, a sexual battery or similar act would
be evidence of a tort committed with a preconceived design to inflict injury
and would therefore also lack a therapeutic motive.
The test for MICRA applicability should therefore have two parts: The
first should determine whether the injury complained of was caused by
conduct which is directly related to the manner in which professional services
were provided. The second part should determine whether that conduct was
engaged in with a therapeutic motive.
A. Which Injuries Are "Directly Related" to the
Performance of Professional Services?
The Supreme Court's interpretation of section 425.13 in Central
Pathology provides the first prong to be used in interpreting the language
used in the various MICRA provisions defining "professional negligence."
In deciding which torts should receive protection under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.13(a), the Central Pathology Court explained:
The allegations that identify the nature and cause of a plaintiff's injury
must be examined to determine whether each is directly related to the
manner in which professional services were provided. Thus, a cause of
action against a health care provider for battery predicated on treatment
exceeding or different from that to which a plaintiff consented is governed
by section 425.13 because the injury arose out of the manner in which
professional services are provided. By contrast, a cause of action against
a health care provider for sexual battery would not be directly related to
the manner in which professional services were rendered .... 1
In so holding, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the distinction set forth in
Waters; that torts which are committed with a therapeutic motive should be
covered regardless of the level of intent involved. According to Central
Pathology, the test for whether an injury is directly related to the perfor-
mance of a health care provider's professional services is twofold. Whether
an injury is directly related turns, not only on the provider's subjective
motivations, but on whether-definitionally-"the injury that is the basis for
the claim was caused by conduct that was directly related to the rendition of
professional services." 2 Under this part of the test, to be directly related
a claim must "emanate[] from the manner in which [the] defendant[]"
230. Studley v. Benicia Unified School Dist., 281 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634 (Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1991); California Shoppers Inc. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 221 Cal. Rptr. 171, 186 (Ct. App.
4th Dist. 1985). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Overton, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823, 828 (Ct. App. 2d
Dist. 1984) (holding that a criminal conviction of battery does not necessarily determine that the
defendant acted with "intent to harm" or a "preconceived design to inflict injury").




Arentz: Defining "Professional Negligence" After Central Pathology Servic
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
performs medical services-which is defined as "a matter that is an ordinary
and usual part of medical professional services."11 3
Accordingly, the first prong of the test asks (1) whether the injury
resulted from conduct directly related to the rendition of professional
services, and (2) whether those services are a matter ordinarily and usually
a part of medical professional services. Both prongs of this test set forth
objective definitional criteria. The second part of the test asks whether the
conduct from which the tort arose was engaged in for a therapeutic purpose.
The necessity for this second subjective prong of the test is obvious. An
objective test alone would not necessarily ensure that MICRA's protections
apply in appropriate circumstances. Recall that in Central Pathology, the
Hulls based their fraud cause of action on allegations the defendants
intentionally failed to notify Constance Hull she should be retested despite the
fact she was allegedly developing cancer, and that the defendants tried to
cover up their alleged negligence. 4 An additional subjective prong should
apply to those provisions which are not simply hurdles to be crossed at the
pleading stage. Rather, MICRA should apply only in situations where health
care providers are performing the medical services for which the Legislature
intended to ensure availability. Thus, for example, fraudulent conduct-if
proven to have been engaged in for reasons unrelated to the performance of
professional services-should not be subject to MICRA's limitations. 5
For example, the complaint in Waters v. Bourhis,216 against the
psychiatrist contained allegations of sexual misconduct. 7  The Central
Pathology Court opined that this type of conduct would not be directly
233. Id. For example, the court in Andrea N. v. Laurelwood Community Hospital, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 894, 905 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1993) apply held that the failure to provide adequate
security was not a claim "arising out of" the professional negligence of a health care provider
because to do so would obliterate the distinction between professional and ordinary negligence.
234. Id. at 926.
235. That is not to say MICRA should not apply objectively at the initial stage where such
allegations are not yet proven. For instance the 90-day notice and tolling provisions could use
an objective "directly related" test similar to section 425.13(a). A similar problem is posed by
the issue of a "hybrid" settlement which does not clearly specify the theory of recovery. See
discussion of Waters v. Bourhis, supra notes 122-145 and accompanying text. One possible
solution would be to apportion the settlement into MICRA and non-MICRA recoveries and make
such a stipulation a part of the settlement.
236. 709 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1985).
237. Waters, 709 P.2d at 471. The Waters Court described the sexual misconduct.
According to the allegations of the complaint filed in the earlier action . . .
Shonkwiler started to engage in a variety of sexual activities with plaintiff a few
months after treatment began. These activities allegedly "rang[ed] from directing her
to observe [him] as he masturbated to compelling her to submit to sexual inter-
course." The complaint alleged that at times Shonkwiler induced plaintiff to
participate in sexual conduct by suggesting that it was part of the therapy designed
to alleviate her sexual inhibitions, and at other times he coerced her to participate by
threatening to have her institutionalized if she did not cooperate.
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related to the manner in which professional services were rendered"3 The
Court held Waters' claim stated a cause of action for "professional negli-
gence" since it in part was based on the psychiatrist's "negligent mishandling
of the so-called 'transference phenomenon.""' However, while such acts
would constitute "professional negligence" and would therefore be directly
related to the manner in which professional services were rendered,
according to Waters at least part of the action fell outside of MICRA. 2 °
With respect to the cause of action based on intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the decision is less than clear. 24'
B. Which Torts are Committed With a Therapeutic Motive?
Besides being directly related to the manner in which professional
services were rendered, a tort covered by MICRA should arise only from
conduct that was intended protection by the Legislature when it enacted
MICRA. Not only does such conduct need to be within the scope of services
for which the provider is licensed, it also must have been committed as a part
of performing professional services.
Under this second, subjective test for coverage, a court would look at the
purpose behind the alleged conduct that forms the basis for the complaint as
well the nature of the conduct itself. Those acts committed with a "therapeu-
tic" purpose should be covered, whereas those committed for purely personal
reasons would not.242 As Waters impliedly holds, nontherapeutic motive
marks the distinction between MICRA and non-MICRA theories.243 This
distinction, rather than that between negligence/intentional torts, is the
appropriate demarcation.
This prong of the test states a subjective criteria; was there a "therapeu-
tic motive?" A further explanation of the phrase "therapeutic motive" is best
illustrated by some out of state decisions which have examined the issue.
238. Central Pathology, 832 P.2d at 931 (citing Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469).
239. Waters, 709 P.2d at 475 n.8.
240. See Waters, 709 P.2d at 477-478 (explaining the purported difference between
"MICRA" and "non-MICRA" theories).
241. See supra notes 141-151 and accompanying text.
242. CMA BRIEF (Szkorla), supra note 96, at 11. For an analysis of Central Pathology
which focuses on the class of victims, rather than the defendant's conduct, see, e.g., Russell A.
Gold, Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court: Statute Limiting
Punitive Damages For the Professional Negligence of Health Care Providers Includes Intentional
Torts, 30 SAN DiEGO L. Rnv. 621 (1993).
243. Id. at 10-11. For the contrary view see Szkorla v. Vecchione, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 230,
where the court replies:
Amici also quote language from Waters, supra, [citations] that they claim implicitly
holds a non-MICRA theory requires proof of intentional misconduct engaged in for
personal as opposed to professional motives. However, the quoted language was used
by the Waters court merely to frame the defendant's argument on appeal and is, at
most, mere dicta, but, in no event, is it a holding of the case.
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Nearly every state has enacted some type of malpractice reform statute.
These statutes limit the amount malpractice plaintiffs can recover, require
periodic payment of damages, limit contingency fees in malpractice cases,
shorten the statute of limitations, or require that malpractice clahns be
submitted to an arbitration panel.2' Some malpractice reform statutes have
been drafted to cover "malpractice" or "any tort . . . based on health care
or professional services. "245 The result has been that, the courts of those
states have interpreted their statutes as including intentional torts.2' I n
deciding which causes of action are covered under those statutes one court
has used a test similar to the "therapeutic motive" test proposed here. In
Collins v. Thakkar,247 the plaintiff brought an action against her physician
alleging wrongful abortion, assault and battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress based upon allegations that the defendant physician
purposely performed an abortion without her consent.2'z The court held
that the complaint did not come within the scope of Indiana's Medical
Malpractice Act which requires submission of all proposed malpractice
complaints to a medical review panel before filing suit against a health care
provider. 249
244. For a partial listing of state malpractice reform statutes, see Elizabeth Urban IKarzon,
Medical Malpractice Statutes: A Retrospective Analysis, 3 ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 693 (1934).
245. See, e.g., IND. CODE 16-9.5-1-1 (h) ("'Malpractice' means a tort or breach of contract
based on health care or professional services.. . ."); Others are drawn more broadly. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. L. ANN. c. 231, § 60B (medical malpractice tribunal has jurisdiction over actions
for "malpractice, error or mistake."); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (defining "malpractice"
as "any tort based on health care or professional services rendered"). Compare LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.41A(8) (covers only unintentional torts).
246. See Glisson v. Loxley, 366 S.E.2d 68, 72 (Va. 1988) (arthroscopic knee surgery
which physician agreed he would not perform was a battery but was nevertheless covered by the
state medical malpractice review statute as a "tort based on health care or professional services
rendered."); Martin v. Southern Baptist Hospital of New Orleans, 444 So. 2d 1309, 1312 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1984) (claim that hysterectomy was performed by a physician other than the
physician with whom patient had contracted stated a cause of action for assault and battery which
was nevertheless covered by malpractice statute); Lubanes v. George, 435 N.E.2d 1031, 1034
(Mass. 1982) (claim for battery covered as an action for "malpractice, error, or mistake against
a provider of health care"). But see Jackson v. Biscayne Medical Center, 347 So. 2d 721, 722
(Fla. App. 3d Dist. 1977) (ordinary assault and battery by hospital employees not covered by
malpractice statute); Leger v. Delahoussaye, 464 So. 2d 1, 4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (cause
of action for assault and battery not covered by statute which defines "malpractice" as "any
unintentional tort."); Jure v. Raviotta, 612 So.2d 255 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (sexual
misconduct not covered).
For a summary of various state malpractice reform statutes and their coverage of different
types of tortious conduct see Holly Piehler Rockwell, Annotation, What Patient Claims Against
Doctor, Hospital, or Similar Health Care Provider Are Not Subject to Statutes Specifically
Governing Actions and Damages for Medical Malpractice, 89 A.L.R. 4th 887.
247. 552 N.E.2d 507 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1990).
248. Collins, 552 N.E.2d at 509. Collins alleged that the defendant entered into a romantic
relationship with her while she was his patient. She alleged that she consulted him about
concerns that she had become pregnant by him. The defendant performed an examination and,
after advising her that she was not pregnant, proceeded to perform an abortion despite her
protests and without her consent.
249. Collins, 552 N.E.2d at 511; IND. CODE 16-9.5-1-1 et seq.
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The court explained that, while the statute was drafted to cover "any tort
S.. based on health care or professional services rendered,"'I the Act was
therefore intended to cover only those, "actions undertaken in the intent of
or for the benefit of the patient's health, i.e., conduct engaged in by a
physician which is curative or salutary in nature or effect. Acts or practices
committed with something other than a remedial purpose would again be
excluded by implication." '  The court concluded that "the conduct
described in the complaint is both wanton and gratuitous. In no way can it
logically be said that the legislature intended such behavior to constitute the
rendition of health care or professional services."2 However, the court
was careful to add:
We caution that this decision is not intended to reflect an opinion on the
applicability of the act to intentional torts as a class as there may well be
such torts based upon the rendition of health care or professional services
which were intended to come within the Act's scope.
The same court later distinguished Collins in Van Sice v. Sentany, a
where the plaintiff brought an action alleging causes of action for fraud and
battery against the surgeon who operated on his finger. The court held that
the plaintiff's claim was not removed from the requirements of the statute
because the plain language of the statute suggested an interest to cover all
conduct related to the promotion of the patient's health or the health care
provider's exercise of professional judgment.' Thus, the plaintiff's claims
for fraud and battery were covered by the Act because they were torts based
on the rendition of professional services.
Hagan v. Antonio 6 shows the necessity of the second subjective prong
of the test. There, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's
allegation of sexual battery constituted malpractice which required prior
notice before a suit could be filed. 7 In Hagan, the plaintiff alleged that,
while performing a breast examination, the defendant ran his hands over her
nipples and asked her if she was excited. She then sued, claiming the
defendant was liable for assault and battery as well as intentional infliction
250. Id. at 510 (citing IND. CODE § 16-9.5-1-1(h)).
251. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
252. Id. at 511.
253. Id.
254. 595 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. App. Ist Dist. 1992).
255. Van Sice, 595 N.E.2d at 266.
256. 397 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1990).
257. Hagan, 397 S.E.2d at 812. VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 defines "malpractice" as "any
tort based on health care or professional services rendered, or which should have been rendered,
by a health care provider, to a patient." VA. CODE § 8.01-581.1 defines "health care" as "any
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of emotional distress." The court held that such conduct was covered by
the statute, focusing narrowly on the fact that the alleged battery occurred
during the course of a physical examination 59 A vigorous dissent argued
that "acts [which] would constitute the crime of sexual assault" should not
be covered by the statute.' "The tort alleged by Hagan was not a tort
based upon the provision of health care but rather a tort arising out of Dr.
Antonio's prurient interests and actions. "26
This reasoning correctly focused on the motivations of the defendant.
An objective analysis such as that used by the majority would not provide
sufficient protection. As the Central Pathology court observed, a sexual
battery would not be directly related to the performance of professional
services. Likewise, a tort that is committed without a therapeutic purpose
should not receive the protection under MICRA.
In Colton v. Dewey,262 the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted
language very similar to that used in MICRA to hold the plaintiff's claim for
fraud was barred by the ultimate 10 year period of repose imposed on actions
for professional negligence. The language of that statute is similar to the
language used in MICRA and applies to, "[a]ny action to recover damages
based on alleged professional negligence. "'2 In Colton, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant physician affirmatively misrepresented the effects
of radiation therapy which she underwent in order to treat her chronic
asthma. After upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the court
remanded the case to consider whether the plaintiff's action for fraud took
her case out of the professional negligence period of limitations. In so
ordering, the court noted that, "any professional misconduct or any
258. Id. at 811.
259. Id. at 812. As the court explained:
When the statutory definitions are applied to the facts alleged, the conclusion must
be that defendant's conduct, legitimate or improper, was 'based on' an 'act' by a
health care provider to 'a patient during the patient's medical ... care.' In other
words, the defendant's conduct ... stemmed from, arose from, and was 'based on'
the performance of a physical examination.
Id. The court ignored plaintiff's argument that, to so hold, would mean that any robbery or rape
committed during the course of a physician's exam would be covered by the statute, explaining:
It is undisputed that a breast examination, including the touching, is an inseparable
part of a typical, complete physical examination of a woman. Rape or robbery
during such an examination, or during treatment of a patient, could never arguably
be classified as an inseparable part of examination or treatment.
Id.
260. Id. at 812 (Hassell, J. dissenting).
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. 321 N.W.2d 913 (Neb. 1982).
263. Colton, 321 N.W.2d at 915 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222). The statute also
covers actions for breach of warranty. The statute covers any professionals and is not limited
to health care providers.
258 [Vol. 30
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unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in the performance of professional or
fiduciary duties is 'malpractice' and comes within the professional or
malpractice statute of limitations.2 4
Those decisions which have addressed the issue of whether malpractice
reform statutes should cover torts other than negligence have resolved that
issue in favor of coverage. However, this is mostly due to the fact that other
statutes have been drafted very broadly to include all malpractice torts.
Absent any action by the California State Legislature to redraft or amend
MICRA to specifically include intentional torts, it will fall to the courts of
this state to interpret the phrase "based on professional negligence" as
broadly as possible, consistent with the policy for which MIRCA was
enacted; to help lower insurance rates and increased the affordability of
health care. In making this interpretation, the test proposed here should be
used to determine which conduct falls within the scope of MICRA.
C. Specific Torts
1. "Technical" Battery
A claim for battery is only a short step away from negligence with
respect to the intent required to commit the tort. A person is liable for
battery if "he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the
person of the other ... or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
. . . an offensive contact . . . results.""26 "[B]attery requires no showing
of 'scienter' or any intent to do wrong-only an intent to cause the harmful
unconsented touching.'266
In Cobbs v. Grant,267 the California Supreme Court refined the
distinction between battery and negligence in the medical malpractice context.
"Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of
treatment and subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for
which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery."26 The
Court distinguished battery cases from those where the allegation was that the
264. Id. at 917.
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 18 (4th ed. 1989).
266. Freedman v. Superior Court, 263 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1989). "In short,just as [i]t has long been established, both in tort and criminal law, that 'the least touching may
constitute battery,' a conviction of this offense neither requires nor necessarily determines that
the defendant 'intentionally caused bodily injury' in the sense of physical harm." Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Overton, 206 Cal. Rptr. 823, 827 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984).
267. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
268. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 7 (emphasis added).
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physician failed to obtain an informed consent, holding that such cases
properly sounded in negligence. 69
Where a health care provider commits a battery through conduct that has
a therapeutic purpose, the cause of action arising out of that conduct is a
"technical battery."27  This level of intent is not so far removed from
negligence. 21
As one author explains:
[T]he doctor's motivation may mark the difference between an act, on the
one side, which constitutes battery as against one, on the other, which
amounts to no more than a subspecies of professional negligence. Where,
269. The Cobbs court further explained:
The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor
performs an operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives
permission to perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the
requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present.
However, when the patient consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that
treatment but an undisclosed inherent complication with a low probability occurs, no
intentional deviation from the consent given appears; rather, the doctor in obtaining
consent may have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose pertinent information.
In that situation the action should be pleaded in negligence.
Id. at 8.
270. Grieves v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. Rptr. 556, 559 (Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1984) (a
surgical procedure which exceeds the conditional consent of the patient constitutes a technical
battery); accord Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 904-905 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1991);
Valdez v. Percy, 96 P.2d 142, 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1939) ("where a person has been
subjected to an operation without his consent such an operation constitutes technical assault and
battery."); Pedesky v. Bleiberg, 59 Cal. Rptr. 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1967) ("When an
action is based upon the theory of surgery beyond consent, the gist of such action is the
unwarranted exceeding of the consent. This is a theory of technical battery."); Weinstock v.
Eissler, 36 Cal. Rptr. 537, 551 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1964) (operation performed without consent
constitutes technical assault and battery); Hundley v. St. Francis Hospital, 327 P.2d 131, 135
(Ct. App. Ist Dist. 1958) (unauthorized removal of organs constitutes a technical battery).
271. As the court in American Employer's Ins. Co. v. Smith, 163 Cal. Rptr. 649 (Ct. App.
3d Dist. 1980) explained:
Negligence has been variously defined and is, according to Prosser, one kind of conduct.
Negligence is a matter of risk-that is to say, of recognizable danger of injury. It has been
defined as "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk of causing damage," or,
more fully, conduct "which falls below the standard established by law for the protection
of others against unreasonably great risk of harm." "Negligence is conduct, and not a state
of mind." In most instances, it is caused by heedlessness or carelessness, which makes
the negligent party unaware of the result which may follow from his act. But it may also
exist where he has considered the possible consequences carefully, and has exercised his
own best judgment.
Conduct which causes harm may extend from total innocence to intentional
misconduct. "As the probability of injury to another, apparent from the facts within
his knowledge, becomes greater, his conduct takes on more of the attributes of intent,
until it reaches that substantial certainty of harm which juries, and sometimes courts,
may find inseparable from intent itself. Such intermediate mental states, based upon
a recognizable great probability of harm, may still properly be classed as "negli-
gence,' but are commonly called 'reckless,' 'wanton,' or even 'wilful.'"
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for example, the patient agrees to go ahead on the basis of a deception that
the permitted act will have a therapeutic benefit whereas, in reality,the
doctor performs the touching with an ulterior motive unrelated to therapy,
a battery may occur. However, even a deception of a "white lie" type that
induces the patient to proceed will not rise to the level of a battery if the
well meaning provider, in that deception, intended to deliver a therapeutic
benefit.2'
A physician may also be liable for battery if he is not the physician the
patient consented to have perform the surgery.2' I Nevertheless, many of
these acts would be insurable and would be acts committed with a therapeutic
purpose. MICRA should apply to all instances of "technical battery" where
there is no preconceived design to harm the patient, or to intentionally
deviate from the consent given.
2. Fraud
"Fraud is an intentional tort, the elements of which are (1) misrepresen-
tation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance;
(4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage."274 A fiduciary relation-
ship exists between the patient and the physician. Thus, the physician has
a duty to fully disclose the nature and extent of injuries and treatment and
any material concealment or misrepresentation constitutes fraud entitling the
party injured thereby to a cause of action. The duty of disclosure is
measured by a fiduciary standard and a physician who withholds facts
necessary to total disclosure subjects himself to liability. 5
For an action for fraud to be covered by MICRA under this proposal,
the conduct giving rise to the action for fraud must have been engaged in
with a therapeutic motive. In Central Pathology, the Court opined that the
plaintiffs' cause of action for fraud was directly related to the performance
of professional services in that it arose from the manner in which the
defendant communicated the results of medical tests, "a matter that is an
ordinary and usual part of medical professional services." However, while
such conduct may definitionally fall within the scope of the physician's
services, it may not satisfy the subjective therapeutic motive test. If
fraudulent conduct was proven at trial to have been engaged in for reasons
272. GEORGE MCDONALD, CALIFORNIA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE, 106
(West 1992) (footnotes omitted).
273. Id. at 107.
274. Nelson v. Gaunt, 178 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1981).
275. Nelson, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 172; Berkey v. Anderson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67, 77 (Ct. App.
2d Dist. 1969); Garlock v. Cole, 18 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1962); Bowman v.
McPheeters, 176 P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 1947); Stafford v. Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1954).
Such a duty may require that a physician disclose any financial or intellectual motives he may
have in the patient's care. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793
P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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unrelated to the patient's care and treatment, any resulting judgment should
not be covered by MICRA.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
A physician may be held liable for engaging in "extreme and outrageous
conduct" which intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional dis-
tress.276 As noted above, conduct which is engaged for purely personal as
opposed to professional motives would not be covered by MICRA as conduct
with a therapeutic purpose.2'
4. Breach of Contract
In rare cases, a physician may be held liable for breach of contract as the
result of the failure to perform an express oral contract to effect a cure or
achieve a certain result." Such actions for breach of warranty are
considered by the courts to be tort actions and are therefore governed by the
one year statute of limitation in Code of Civil Procedure section 340(3) as
"[a]n action for... injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another."" As one court observed, "the clear thrust of
the cause [of action for breach of warranty] is one for personal injury. It is
basically the same as the cause of action alleging negligence."' There-
fore, it not would be a much further leap to conclude that such action should
be covered by MICRA as an action "based upon professional negli-
gence. "21
276. MCDONALD, supra note 272, at 590. See, e.g., Waters v. Bourhis, 709 P.2d 469 (Cal.
1985) (psychiatrist's sexual misconduct with patient may constitute an intentional tort as well as
professional negligence); Cf. Urbaniak v. Newton, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (Ct. App. 1st Dist.
1991) (physician's disclosure of plaintiff's HIV status not "outrageous" conduct sufficient to
present triable issue of fact on theory of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress). See generally Recovery for Emotional Distress Resulting From Statement of Medical
Practitioner or Official, Allegedly Constituting Outrageous Conduct, 34 A.L.R.4th 688.
277. See discussion of Waters v. Bourhis supra notes 122-152 and accompanying text.
278. McKinney v. Nash, 174 Cal. Rptr. 642, 648-649 (Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1981). "[To
recover for breach of warranty or contract in a medical malpractice case, there must be proof
of an express contract by which the physician clearly promises a particular result and the patient
consents to treatment in reliance on that promise."
279. Brown v. Bleiberg, 651 P.2d 815, 817 n.1 (Cal. 1982); Rose v. Fife, 255 Cal. Rptr.
440, 447-48 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989); Cardoso v. American Medical Systems, 228 Cal. Rptr.
627, 630 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1986).
280. Cardoso, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 630. Accord, Christ v. Lipsitz, 160 Cal. Rptr. 498, 501
(Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1979) ("It is settled that an action against a doctor arising out of his
negligent treatment is an action sounding in tort and not one based upon a contract.").
281. For the contrary view see Selected 1975 California Legislation, supra note 3, at 562.
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In interpreting Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13(a), the court in
Central Pathology has reopened the debate regarding coverage of certain
intentional torts under MICRA. Like the various MICRA provisions on
which it was based, section 425.13 applies to all intentional torts "arising out
of" claims for professional negligence. Similarly, MICRA's provisions,
apply to "any action" "based upon professional negligence. " Furthermore,
the Court's decision in Waters v. Bourhis explicitly reserved ruling on the
issue of whether MICRA covers intentional torts "based upon" conduct
engaged in for a therapeutic purpose. Since the Court in Central Pathology
has opined that no distinction exists between the words "arising out of' and
"based upon," MICRA should be interpreted to cover all torts which occur
in the malpractice setting, intentional or otherwise, as actions "based upon"
professional negligence.
MICRA was enacted to ensure affordable health care through a reduction
in malpractice insurance rates. California's malpractice reform statute has
been considered as a model for reform efforts at the national level.'
Expanding MICRA's coverage would further this purpose. Indeed, it makes
little sense to exclude from coverage other tortious conduct especially since
the cost of paying judgments resulting from those torts would be born by
insurers. In tort law there exists only the finest line between tortious conduct
which is negligent and that which is intentional. The true litmus test for
MICRA coverage should be whether the conduct complained ,of was
committed by the health care provider with a therapeutic purpose.
282. Jost, supra note 22, at 69. The American Medical Association has advocated changes
in the malpractice system which mirror those instituted by MICRA; specifically, a cap on pain
and suffering damages, a limitation on attorneys fees, abolishing the "collateral source" rule,
and periodic payment of future damages. Id.
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